## IQBAL EXISTENTIALISM AND OTHER ARTICLES

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PROF. NIAZ ERFAN

# Iqbal - Existentialism and other Articles

Prof. Niaz Erfan





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
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#### FOREWORD

Allama Iqbal's writings in prose and verse are like an ocean - those who dive deep into it come out with myriad varieties of peals. In the same way those who ponder deep over the works of Iqbal discover myriad pearls of wisdom in his writings. so many scholars have worked and are working on Iqbal all over the world and they all have found new meanings in his writings.

Prof. Niaz Erfan was the first writer who in 1960's took up the study of Iqbal visa vis Existentialists. There is much in common between Iqbal and existentialists and in many ways the ideas of Iqbal are at variance with their views. It is because there are many shades of existentialistic thought, but they fall in 2 broad categories - theists and atheists. Naturally Iqbal's ideas are more akin with the theistic brand of existentialists, such as Kirkegaard and Jaspers. Like Iqbal they believe in uniqueness of human ago, its freedom, subjectivity etc., but being the follower of Quranic teachings he is an exponent of moderation in these and other matters.

Prof. Niaz Erfan has exhaustively analyzed points of resemblance and points of difference between Iqbal's and existentialists' approaches. His book is surely a valuable addition to the existing literature on Iqbal.

I am sure it will prove to be a good source for scholars who might like to work an Iqbal in future.

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#### INTRODUCTION

It was in 1959 that Late Prof. M.M. Sharif asked me to write on Existentialism and Iqbal for the session of Pakistan Philosophical congress to be held in 1960 under the auspices of Rajshahi University in the then East Pakistan. It was a bit difficult task as upto the year 1955, when I passed my M.A. examination in Philosophy, Existentialism was not introduced in the courses of studies in Pakistan Universities, nor any literature was available on the subject in the public or private or perhaps even in the University Libraries. It was a challenging task for me as I had not studied the subject. By the year 1960 some literature had become available in the market. So I got hold of whatever I could lay my hands on from what ever sources I could tap. I even imported some books from abroad. I wrote my first article entitled: "What is Common Between Existentialists and Iqbal". I had to work very hard to do justice to the topic.

It was the first writing on Existentialists and a comparison between the philosophical ideas of existentialists and Iqbal.

It game me immense joy when Prof. M.M. Sharif highly appreciated my work and he exhorted me to write more on the subject. Having been encouraged by the appreciation of my work, I wrote my second article on "Existentialists vs Iqbal", which was also welcomed both by the lovers of Iqbal and the students of philosophy in Pakistan.

Briefly speaking Existentialism stands for the freedom of choice, subjectivity, uniqueness of human individual and personal

responsibility and Iqbal also held the same views, but they differed in many vital points, for example the limit of human freedom, role of divine revelation in human life, individual and society etc.

The value of Existentialism may diminish with the passage of time, but its value with reference to Iqbal's thinking is not likely to diminish and it will remain a subject of abiding interest for the students of Iqbaliat.

This small book is a humble homage to our great philosopher Allama Iqbal.

Prof. Niaz Erfan

### IQBAL AND EXTENTIALISM - POINTS OF RESEMBLENCE

I

The very mention of Iqbal and Existentialism together may cause many to raise their eyebrows over such an innovation, for though numerous books have been written on every aspect of Iqbal, nothing of this kind has ever been said or suggested before. However, there should be no cause for alarm. Those who think that no existentialistic elements can be traced in Igbal commit a very grave fallacy by limiting the scope of his philosophy. Some enthusiasts like to brand his philosophy this way or that and they exult in allotting him place among the philosophers of a particular school. But it will be highly unjust thus to categorise his philosophy with one label or the other, for he had his own system, composed of variegated elements; there are certainly elements in his philosophy which he has in common with the existentialist thinkers. Although it will be prepostrous to dub him as an existentialist, yet the fact of his having existentialistic tendencies cannot be denied. I shall endeavour to bring to light such tendencies of his system.

#### H

Before proceeding further we will be well advised to state as briefly the basic concepts of Existentialism.

In the present-day\* Europe, it has become a fashion for all those who know of Existentialism—of course, leaving aside those who actually belong to this movement—either to be called

<sup>\*</sup> This Chapter was written in 1960.

existentialists without knowing what it means to be an extentialist or to denounce it without sincerely trying to understand it. It is perhaps the most commonly misunderstood movement of the modern philosophy.

Existentialism is fundamentally the philosophy of revolt. First of all it revolted against the objectification and abstractions of Greek philosophy, where, except for a very brief period, the philosophers had either been interested in the world around or had been lost in abstract thought. The conscious being, the concrete individual, thinking over the problems, received serious attention of the existentialists.

Secondly, it revolted against the rationalistic tradition of the modern philosophy with its ground in Descartes' formula of *cogito ergo sum* which gave priority to abstract knowledge over concrete existence. This rationalistic trend culminated in Hegel's system which was formulated to prove Plato's thesis equating rationality with reality. In fact this love for systems is only a way of escape from the problems which have been throttling man. Not only that the systems have been responsible for taking away from man his liberty; required to live under systems and to conform to them, he ceases to be himself.

In the third place, Existentialism revolts against the dehumanisation of man in this era of mechanisation and industrialisation. The process of self-estrangement which started in the Greek period, continuing through the age of rationalism, has reached its climax in the modern machine age. Man has been rendered a commodity among other commodities and as something superfluous. The scientists won't condescend to recognise the worth of man as a dynamic being. Their's is the verld of calculations, measurements and statistical generalities. 'By a sort of fundamental

abstractedness they have built up the myth of a world which is primarily the world to the exclusion of personality; it is a purely objective world with no person in it to make it credible.'<sup>2</sup>

Existentialism calls man back from his lofty soarings in the realm of abstract ideas down to his concrete earthly existence. It exhorts him to face his realities and not to escape from them. 'It consists in pre-emptorily sunimoning man back from intimate or worldly distractions to his state of being as an existent.' It calls man away from stifling abstractions and automatic conformity. It drives us back to the most basic inner problems: what it means to be a self, how we ought to use freedom, how we can find and keep the courage to face death; even more, it bids each individual thinker to wrestle with these problems until he has grown into personal authenticity, instead of taking his answers from someone else.<sup>4</sup>

Existentialism has waged a war against objectification. It exhorts us to wake up and revert to inwardness and subjectivity. It may be pointed out that this subjectivity which is so greatly stressed by the existentialists is not the idealistic subjectivity of the kind Berkley advocated; on the contrary, it is the personal, existential and dynamic subjectivity which is true inwardness and creativity.

Self-estrangement is an evil and both Pascal and Kierkegaard are unanimous in holding that much of natural evil, pain and suffering can be banished from the world only if man can overcome the fundamental evil of estrangement from himself and from God. Disharmony with his own nature and with God are the source of evil. Therefore dehumanisation of every sort must be put an end to; man must learn to rely upon his concrete experience. It must be remembered that Existentialism does not militate only against what we may call secular or material dehumanisation, it equally fights against the religious dehumanisation of man. Pascal and

Kierkegaard, for example, vehemently oppose such a dehumanisation ushered in by the rise of Lutherian protestantism and puritanism. Religion is not the matter of hollow conformity to certain precepts and conventions. Each individual must win his personal salvation. It is only his own concrete religious experience which will help him acquire true authenticity before God.

According to existenialists only the human individual is capable of making decisions and only he has a 'self.' No doubt he is not responsible for his physical presence here. On gaining consciousness he discovers himself as being already there. In life his main task is to become the true self and to strengthen it by decision and deed.

Existentialists regard human individual as constituted by both mind and body. However, they do not view him as body plus mind, but as a dynamic unity with two aspects, body and mind. Kierkegaard regards the self as a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, freedom and necessity. Jaspers regards it as the total, unique individual, including will, emotion, body and unconsciousness.

Self lives in duration and pure time. Heidegger tells us that the time of the human individual is different from that of the objects. The former involves decision and the latter succession.Like Heidegger, Sartre also thinks that man's way of dealing with time is very different from the physicist's notion of time. My past is as much a part of my factity as any purely physical event, but I can transcend my past and I can relate past, present and future just because I am never simply 'myself' in the sense in which a tree is 'itself.' The serial time is to be conquered and Kierkegaard tells us that one way of conquering time is by being related to the absolute in the midst of everyday existence. Kierkegaard challenges the monastic view that in order to achieve inwardness one has to renounce the world. He

holds one can do so while continuing to participate in the daily events of life. In order to strive for the spiritual evolution man must exist in time and yet the aim of his striving is not a finite goal. In short, Existentialism solves the problem of the body and mind by overcoming the duality of body and mind. It regards man as bodymind unity.

The next point stressed by Existentialism regarding the human existent is his uniqueness and individuality. Existence cannot be defined; it can only be 'greeted' and recognised. It is inexhaustible and as such it is non-classifiable 'right down to its tiniest particle.'5

Existentialists also stress the uniqueness of personal experience. They hold all type of authentic knowledge as possible only through a sort of mystic experience or intuition, for discursive knowledge is incapable of providing us with certainty. For Existentialism the fundamental difference is between knowing about the truth in some theoretical way and being grasped by the truth in a decisively personal way. Most of the existentialists make boredom and dread as the intuitive state which reveals being and existence.

This personal experience, according to the existentialists, is incommunicable. Kierkegaard is of the view that direct communication is appropriate for objective thinking and indirect communication is appropriate for objective knowledge. Like mystics the existentialists are aware of the inadequacy of all languages fashioned with man-word correlation (which of course, they belive, is the only language available) 'whenever one attempts to characterise the fullness and emptiness, the allness and emptiness of ultimate reality. 6 'Near and hard to grasp is the God,' says Holderlin, the poet whom Heidegger greatly admires. Jaspers finds communion with God possible only through cyphers— mysterious symbols—as no other concrete method for such relationship is possible. He also

holds that prayer in a purified sense is the only appropriate manner whereby man can be related to God. It is the living relatedness to the Transcendent instead of talk about such a relationship. The prayer can mean the building up of one's strength through meditation on the source of creativity and freedom; seeking only an inward transfiguration and expecting no external results; it can save worship from being corrupted by mixed motives. Marcel also holds that the meeting with the external 'Thou' takes place wholly in inwardness.

By far the most central theme of the existentialists is the freedom of the human individual. It is only the application of the free will that gives authenticity to the existent, who otherwise would be a thing among other things. It is through acts of choice and decision that he discovers himself as a being distinct from other beings in the world. Existentialists are opposed both to determinism and indeterminism. I say this with particular reference to Marcel who expressly holds to self-determinism. By virtue of his freedom, man freely chooses his future and therefore himself. Thus he is personally responsible and this is a heavy responsibility that he takes upon himself. The refusal to take a decision on the part of man may look to be an act of freedom, but Kierkegaard tells us that 'what looks like perfect freedom turns out to be perfect bondage .... His refusal to make decisions means that they are made for him' (which amounts to his dependence and enslavement). Hiedegger, stressing the momentousness of decision, writes, 'Because a man makes decisions with reference to his possibilities he can either gain or lose his true self.'7 In this way free choice is a risk but without this risk man cannot hope to get the reward. 'Eternal life, others would call it heroic life,' writes Kierkegaard in his book Post Scriptum, 'is the prize which can only be won by risking absolutely everything.' Thus man is in a tragic situation and for this reason consciously or unconsciously he is in anguish. According to him, free choice and decision and the consequent state of anguish for personal

responsibility is the manifestation of the perfection of human nature. Keeping this feature of Existentialism in view, it is not difficult to understand why the followers of this school so strongly stress the conative side of human mind as against cognitive or affective side. Man's central problem is diagnosed by Heidegger as not the lack of knowledge but as a lack of resolve. According to Jaspers, what is 'I am' is inseparable from decision and deed.

Therefore the philosophy which is the goal of the existentialists is not a system; it is an attitude and approach. They have fully imbibed Fichte's view about the pursuit of philosophy: 'We philosophise out of need for our redemption,' as also Plato's advice of philosophising with one's whole soul than to become fluent about this or that theory. In philosophising the philosopher is personally involved as a concrete individual. He does not merely stand away from his ideas as a machine stands away from its products. A non-existential philosopher is no more than a thought-generating machine. Real philosophy is the same thing as real living. 'This comes close to saying that the good existential philosopher and the good man are identical.' For existentialists the job of philosophy is not to provide ready-made answers to problems. It should rather bring about a change in the inner side of one's self, one's emotions, feelings and hopes.

Often existentialists are scandalised for preaching the cult of nihilism and making nothingness as one of the central problems of philosophy. But it turns out to be less scandalous if we once understand its real significance. No doubt, existentialists postulate nothingness as the main fibre of existence. The very presence of a conscious and free, dynamic human existent amidst the undifferentiated fullness of being or the world of matter is a standing negation of the physical world. The individual is always struggling for accomplishment and for fuller realisation and refinement. He aims

at an unattainable fusion of physical being and spiritual consciousness. It is as if man is struggling to become divine. 'Man,' says Sartre, 'is the being who aspires to be God. Man is basically a desire to be God,' though, as he thinks, it is a useless and futile struggle.

Leaving aside Sartre, who is the preacher of absurdity, almost all the existentialists have to say something about God. Existentialism is a call to the quest of God in a new vein. The modern civilisation has not only led to the estrangement of man from himself but he has also got estranged from God and that is the cause of the widespread despair and anguish of the modern man.

#### Ш

And now we take up and delineate one by one the points which are common between the existentialists and Iqbal.

(1) First of all Iqbal shares with the existentialists a deep-rooted mistrust of the classical Greek philosophy for its love of the abstract and for its neglect of the concrete. Existentialism is 'a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excesses of the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things.'9 Existentialism is basically anticlassical and the existentialist thinkers 'complain that the classical ontology has been dominated by static conceptions." 10 Iqbal who champions the dynamic view of the philosophy of the Our'an, deplores: 'This is what the earlier Muslim students of the Qur'an completely min at under the spell of classical speculation . . . that the spirit of the Qur'an was essentially anticlassical,'ll and he tells us that 'in view of the concrete spirit of the Qur'an and the speculative nature of Greek philosophy this attempt was foredoomed to failure.'12 Therefore, according to Iqbal, 'the first important point to note about the spirit of Muslim culture is that for purposes of knowledge it fixes its gaze on the concrete, the finite. It is further

clear that the birth of the method of observation and experiment in Islam was due not to a compromise with Greek thought but to a prolonged intellectual warfare with it.'13

(2) Iqbal is as much opposed to rationalistic theories as existentialists are. The direction of the modern European philosophy was fixed by Descartes whose famous slogan, Cogito ergo sum, giving priority to essence over existence, became the basis of modern Rationalism. This trend reached its climax in Hegel's idealistic system, which is an 'intellectual totalitarian system in which everything is taken up, harmonised, rationalised and justified.'14 In fact the existentialist polemic against the Hegelian system is directed mostly against excessive claims made for reason. However, we must remember that Existentialism is not, as is sometimes arbitrarily claimed, a form of Irrationalism. It simply does not allow reason so wide a field as many forms of Rationalism do. It merely asserts that reason is not the sole means of becoming aware of existence and that reason can be so penetrating that, in view of man's state, it cannot be the ultimate means for plumbing the depths of existence. Existence means freedom and as such is not completely rationalisable.'15 It simply refuses to hand the monopoly of revealing reality over to the system of classification demanded by Rationalism.'16 Kierkegaard, writing about the Hegelian system, says, '... a philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chimera, if the truth that is sought is something to exist in. To exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Denmark with the help of a small map of Europe, of which Denmark shows no larger than a steel pin point.'17

We find the same degree of mistrust of rationalism and of the competency of reason in Iqbal. Moreover, Iqbal is as much vehement against the suppression of the individuality of man in overorganisation, over-systematisation and totalitarianism as

existentialists are. He laments that the rationalist doctors of Islam in the earlier period 'did not see ... that the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on Organisation as on the worth and power of individual men. In an over-organised society the individual is altogether crushed out of existence. 18 Iqbal looks commendingly upon the efforts of Kant whose warfare with rationalism hastened its downfall in the West. According to him, '[Kant's] Critique of Pure Reason revealed the limitations of human reason and reduced the whole work of the rationalists to a heap of ruins. And justly has he been described as God's greatest gift to his country. Ghazali's philosophical scepticism ... virtually did the same kind of work in the world of Islam in breaking the back of that proud but shallow rationalism which moved in the same direction as pre-Kantian rationalism in Germany.'19 However just as the existentialists do not want to banish reason and intellect altogether from life, in the same way Igbal is not in favour of totally disowning reason and intellect. He agrees with Whitehead that 'the ages of faith are the ages of rationalism,'20 and regards intuition as only a higher kind of intellect.<sup>21</sup> The root cause of all ills of modern society, he thinks, is the excessive reliance placed on the competence of reason. A civilisation founded on 'shallow rationalism,' and devoid of spiritual depth, is, according to him, doomed to disintegration and downfall.

(3) Eistentialism bemoans the constant process of self-estrangement that has been going on in human history. Mankind as a whole has got estranged from itself through civilisations and elaborate social and political systems, and the individual has become a stranger to himself through his blind conformity to the systems. This process is still continuing. Iqbal also laments the tendency among human beings towards self-alienation. In fact man has, according to him, been thwarted to be and become himself either by his excessive indulgence in the sham of life or by the Sufistic 'spirit of total other-worldliness.' In this situation man's gaze remains

focussed outside himself. He seldom turns it inwards with the result that he is a 'broken man,' he is just like a child who having gone out to play forgets to return home and becomes alien to his real abode.

And when he comes to have a glimpse of himself he cannot fully recognise himself:

[I became a stranger to myself to the extent that when I saw myself I could not recognise myself (Atmaghan-i-Hijaz).]

Existentialism believes that this process of self-estrangement has gradually led to the dehumanisation of man. Not only the slavery of the systems but also the craze for urbanisation, industrialisation and mechanisation has deprived man of his essential human attributes, viz. depth, subjectivity and creativity. He is either a mere nonentity in a crowd, or he is just a 'thing' counted, put into service, salvaged and discarded. If he has any worth it is because he performs certain functions; the moment he 'goes out of order,' he is changed, This is how Marcel feels about the dehumanisation of man in this machine age. He illustrates this point concretely by picturing a human individual in the form of a conductor on the subway who is virtually identical with his functions.' His existence is almost wholly routinised. It is that of a timetable, not only in his job but in his role as a member of a union, in his voting, in his habits of eating and sleeping. An expert on industrial hygiene might even be able to specify how much recreation he needs, what kind and at what hours, in order to function well. Of course, sickness and accidents can disturb the routine, but even then there are hospitalization schemes for overhauling and repairing this machine man. And when he dies the company replaces him much in the same manner in which it might replace worn-out machinery. Probably the most "human" characteristic of this man is an obscure unrest which lurks in his heart, indicating that the patterns of modern life violate his own nature. His existence is essentially empty; hence despair, or the need to avoid falling into despair, appropriately reflects the fact that some appalling mistake has occurred and that our so-called civilization tends to stifle instead of to nurture what is distinctly human.<sup>23</sup> Therefore Existentialism warns us 'against the way in which an idolatrous attitude towards science leads us in the direction of dehumanisation in Western culture.<sup>24</sup>

Iqbal too deplores the tendency towards dehumanisation present in this age of increasing over-socialisation, totalitarianism and mechanisation. In an over-organized society,' he tells us, the individual is altogether crushed out of existence.'

[The supremacy of machines is the death of the heart of man. The tools kill what is truly human in man (Bal-i-Jibril) ]

Iqbal regards the over-dependence of man over machines as a form of slavery, whereas, he thinks, they were meant to rid him of drudgery and enslavement:

[The modern civilisation has brought liberty for me but this is actually a shum liberty; as a matter of fact it is a form of enslavement (Bul-i-Jibril).]

(4) Existentialism raises a protest against the application of scientific and objective method indiscriminatingly in every field of life. Its blind pursuit is the bane of the modern age. 'This objective knowledge . . . is assumed by many to be the whole ambition of human thought, because it is assumed that there is nothing which is not given in stable objects registered in the human mind in representations which in logical order are universally intelligible and communicable. Therefore science is the measure of all things.'26 What we in the modern age ought to remember is that 'the acquisition of objective knowledge is never the same thing as becoming myself.'27 The scientific and objective method is inadequate in giving direct and intimate knowledge of our inwardness. It is inadequate in providing us with our inner experience, of ourselves and 'truly great questions of life cannot really be answered by means of scientific information.'29 Iqbal, too, believes that the objective and scientific knowledge, being conceptual in nature, is incapable of bringing us into direct association with reality. He says, 'There is no doubt that the theories of science constitute trustworthy knowledge, because they are verifiable and enable us to predict and control the events of nature. But we must not forget that what is called science is not a single systematic view of reality. It is a mass of sectional views of reality-fragments of a total experience which do not seem to fit together. Natural science deals with matter, with life and with mind; but the moment you ask the question how matter, life, and mind are mutually related, you begin to see the sectional character of the various sciences that deal with them and the inability of these sciences taken singly to furnish a complete answer to your question. In fact the various natural sciences are like so many vultures falling on the dead body of Nature and each running away with a piece of its flesh. Nature as the subject of science is a highly artificial affair and this artificiality is the result of that selective process to which science must subject her in the interests of precision .... Natural science is by nature sectional; it

cannot, if it is true to its own nature and function, set up its theory as a complete view of Reality. The concepts we use in the organization of knowledge are therefore sectional in character and their application is relative to the level of experience to which they are applied.'30 According to Iqbal, thought and intuition, scientific knowledge and the knowledge gained through inner experience differ in so far as 'the one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of reality; the other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the various regions of the whole for exclusive observation.'31 It is evident from the above that Iqbal, like the existentialists, does not wholly disown the scientific and objective method, intellect and thought. These sources of knowledge, however, afford us only an outer view of reality.

[Though intellect too takes us to the threshold of reality, yet it is not capable of affording us any intimate view of it.]

[No doubt there is wealth, power and pleasure in objective knowledge, but the trouble with it is that it cannot afford us an awareness of our own inner selves.] [Intellect brings us information and no more, whereas the remedy of man's ills lies in higher levels of knowledge.]

(5) The whole theory of Existentialism revolves round the problem of 'existence.' Therefore we find each existentialist in his place trying to make clear the significance and the existent. An existent is taken to mean a conscious human individual. 'A man is possibility, he has the power to be. His existence is in his choice of the possibilities which are open to him .... My preoccupations in the world, my tasks, concerns, cares, pursuits, exemplify the manner of my existence.'32 Thus'an existent is a dialectic movement.'33

Likewise, Iqbal too considers the definition of the nature of existence an important problem and his definition has a marked likeness with those given above. He says, 'The ontological problem before us is how to define the ultimate nature of existence.' He would like to 'study some privileged case of existence' in order to understand the nature of existence and finds that 'conscious experience is that privileged case of existence . . . and an analysis of this privileged case is likely to throw a flood of light on the ultimate meaning of existence. What do I find when I fix my gaze on my own conscious experience?' In answer he quotes Bergson: 'I pass from state to state. I am warm or cold. I am merry or sad. I work or do nothing. I look at what is around me or think of something else ... such are the states into which my existence is divided and which colour it in turns. I change, then, without ceasing .... Thus there is nothing static in my inner life; all is a constant mobility, an unceasing

flux of states, a perpetual flow in which there is no halt or resting place. 36 Such is the nature of the existent, according to Iqbal.

(6) Existentialism exhorts us to be our concrete selves. 'It calls men away from stifling abstractions and automatic conformity. It drives us back to the most basic, inner problems; what it means to be self ..... It bids each individual thinker to wrestle with these problems until he has grown into personal authenticity.'<sup>37</sup> 'It calls the spectator of all time and of all existence from the speculations of pure thought to the problems and possibilities of his own conditioned thinking as an existing individual seeking to know how to live.'<sup>38</sup> In short, Existentialism calls man to himself, to be himself. Iqbal too is of the view that 'the ultimate aim of the ego is not to see something but to be something.'<sup>39</sup> In other words, Iqbal recognises, to use existentialist terminology, that the aim of the existent is to win personal authenticity through the application of volition. The following verses of Iqbal also exemplify this existentialist theme:

[Lucky will be the day when you get back to yourself. This is the renunciation (of the external world) which brings you the kingdom of the inner world) (Armaghan-i-Hijaz).]

[You too like me are concealed form yourself. Lucky will be the day when you rediscover yourself (*Ibid.*).]

(7) Existentialism recalls men to inwardness and subjectivity and to their real inner state. It consists in pre-emptorily summoning man back from intimate or worldly distractions to his state of being as an existent. 40 Too much inwardness may be considered to be a madness but 'absence of inwardness is another kind of madness. 41

Iqbal too emphasises the importance of inwardness and subjectivity. A look into his poetic works is sufficient to prove this contention:

[O you ignorant! dive into your self and find out the secret of life. Rise above the plane of serial time and become immortal (Bang-i-dara).]

[The Divine Reality lies in the recesses of your self; search it. That is the only way open for your development (Bal-i-Jibril).]

Here the question arises: Have we to renounce totally the external world in order to gain inwardness? Existentialists and, particularly Keirkegaard, do not think so. Monasticism is criticised for this very reason. 'Monasticism is mistaken . . . because it thinks that inwardness can be achieved by getting rid of the external world .... A man can achieve inwardness while continuing to participate in the ordinary events of life.' 42

Jaspers also holds a similar view in this respect. According to

him, true selfhood cannot be achieved through the cultivation of inwardness at the cost of participation in political and social struggle; it requires action in history at the level of empirical events.<sup>43</sup>

What had been said above also represents the spirit of Iqbal's philosophy. He no doubt emphasises the importance of inwardness and subjectivity, but he is against the 'total other-worldliness' 44 of Sufism. According to him, there is no need of trying to get rid of the external world and the realities of life. 'The cultures of Asia, and in fact of the whole world, failed, because they approached Reality exclusively from within. 45

(8) There exists a wonderful similarity of views between existentialists and Iqbal on the problem of the nature and the constitution of self or ego. Human individual or self occupies a central place in the existentialist philosophy. 'The existentialists share the convention of beginning the metaphysical enquiry with an analysis of the questioning self and its situation. '46 Their first concern is to trace the where and whither of man, his origin and destination. For existentialists the self of the human individual is real and has precedence over everything else. As a matter of fact, the existentialists' attack on Descartes' Cogito formula is based on the objection that it is incapable of giving us the reality of 'self.' Descartes' formula proves the reality of the process of thinking and not of the thinking self. They substitute it with its inverted form, i.e. sum ergo cogito, thus stressing the reality and the primacy of the self.

Iqbal also attacks those idealistic and pragmatic theories which make the self of the human individual unreal. 'The finite centre of experience . . . is real, even though its reality is too profound to be intellectualized.<sup>47</sup>

[(It will be wrong) if you say that the T is an illusion, or that its being is like that of other objects (Zabur-i-Ajam).]

[He who denies God is an infidel in the eyes of the theologian. But he who refuses to believe in the (reality of) human self is a greater infidel in my eyes (Javid Nama).]

But here the question arises: Where does the human self come from? What is its origin and beginning? Existentialists and Iqbal give identical answers to this question.

The que tion of the origin of the human self has always vexed the minds of all thinkers. All sorts of answers have been suggested. However we are not at present concerned with them. We have only to see what Existentialism and Iqbal have to say in this connection. A deep study of existentialism and Iqbal is sure to convince anybody that their views in this regard are remarkably similar. They avoid unnecessary speculation and base their outlook on facts. According to their view, human self, inspite of all its importance, has its beginning in time; it is not there from eternity.

Existentialists clearly advocate that the human individual 'meets' himself as being already there. He does not know where he has come from. Surtre declares that 'I come to myself as a gift .... The ground of self is unknowable; it is rather a mysterious origin which I can choose in the sense of acknowledging and accepting it, not in the sense of producing it. 'Man begins by finding himself thrown into existence.'

According to Iqbal, '... the ego has a beginning in time and did not pre-exist in the spatio-temporal order.' Endowed with a most suitable mutual adjustment of faculties he (man) discovers himself thrown down below in the scale of life surrounded on all sides by the forces of destruction .... His career, no doubt, has a beginning but he is destined to become a permanent element in the constitution of being.'61

What then is the nature of the self? What existentialists and Iqbal equally deny is that it is a thing or a mere arena wherein thoughts appear momentarily and then disappear without leaving any trace behind. 'By "self" Jaspers does not mean a Cartesian res cogitans, but the total unique individual including will, emotion, the body and the unconscious. Yet the self is more than biological and psychological forces since it is not merely a congeries of objective processes .... What "I am", is inseparable from decision and deed.'52 'I have no self in abstraction from my concrete activities, purposes and goals.'53 These questions clearly show that the existentialists do not regard self as a concept or a thing; it is dynamic in so far as it consists in action and deed.

Iqbal delineates this theme in the following words: 'Thus my real personality in not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. You cannot perceive me like a thing in space or a set of experiences in a temporal order; you must interpret, understand and appreciate me in my judgments, in my will-attitudes, aims and aspirations.'54 Further, according to Iqbal, the Qur'an is a book which emphasises deed rather than idea.<sup>55</sup>

[It is the deed which makes or mars life; it is the deed which may lead either to heaven or hell. This mortal is by nature neither good nor bad.]

The human self may be a unity but it has two aspects, the inner and the outer; intensively speaking, it lives in pure duration, in eternal 'now,' but, extensively speaking, it organises itself in serial time. Therefore there are two modes how the self can deal with reality: intuition and intellect, faith and reason. On this fact Marcel bases his division of the self into two sides: the believing 'me' and the reflecting 'me' <sup>56</sup> Iqbal too speaks of the two sides of the self thus: 'It has, so to speak, two sides which may be described as appreciative and efficient .... It is only in the moments of profound meditation when the efficient self is in abeyance, that we sink into our deeper self and reach the inner centre of experience .... The efficient self is the practical self of daily life in its dealings with the external order of things.'<sup>57</sup>

The next characteristic of the human self, which is stressed by at least two among the existentialists on the one hand and Iqbal on the other, is its teleology and forward look. For Heidegger and Jaspers, man is a power to be, an impulsion, a bounding leap (Aufsprung, Absprung), a being in advance of himself (Sichvorwegsein). It is this movement which they call transcendence. .... The existent is always something more than what he is (immediately) even though he is not yet what he shall be. Sartre would say that he is the "being who is not what he is and who is what he is not."58 In the opinion of Heidegger man's capacity for running forward towards authentic existence by way of resolve is the foundation of authentic existence itself.<sup>59</sup> Iqbal too conceives the human self as characterised by teleology. According to him, 'Its nature is teleological. There is however another sense of teleology. From our conscious experience we have seen that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life

is teleological in the sense that there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are. Life is a passage through a series of deaths.\*60

In spite of the fact that some of the existentialists do not tend to allow the human self a permanent place in the scheme of things and regard its 'being' or 'existence' as an absurdity, there are, however, other existentialists, e.g. Kierkegaard and Marcel, who speak of the immortality of the human self. Marcel affirms that the real core of the person, as participating in inter-subjectivity, cannot perish.61 Therefore, according to this line of thought, my self survives the disintegration of my body. But we must remember, Kierkegaard warns us, eternal life does not come to us as a gift. Eternal life—others would call it "heroic life"—is the prize which can only be won by risking absolutely everything.'62 That means immortality has to be achieved; it does not come to us as a matter of course as some would believe it. Iqbal has parallel views on the immortality of human ego. 'The nature of the universe is such that it is open to it to maintain in some other way the kind of individuality necessary for the final working out of human action, even after the disintegration of what appears to specify his individuality in his personal environment.'63 He asserts that personal immortality is not ours as of right, it is to be achieved by personal effort. Man is only a candidate for it ... life offers a scope for ego-activity, and death is the first test of the synthetic activity of the ego. There are no pleasuregiving and pain-giving acts. There are only egosustaining and egodissolving acts.'64

(9) All the classical speculative and rationalistic systems which are attacked equally by the existentialists and Iqbal tended to regard time as unreal. Therefore their opposition of such systems led them

to similar views regarding the nature of time. For them time is real, but which time? Not the serial time but the real time or duration. It is the ego or self which is capable of being affected by change and therefore it lives in real time. As such the time of static objects and that of the self is different. We cannot conceive of human consciousness or self as immersed like a static object in the stream of time. Time is inside it, not outside it. This is Heidegger's view according to whom 'to regard human consciousness as simply immersed in flux is to miss the essential character of temporality itself. For it is a structural whole, not a flat plane where the moment runs along a line .... The unauthentic standpoint misses this because it regards the future merely as something that will happen, looks upon the past as over and done with and fails to infuse the present with resolve.'65 Therefore, whereas the time of the static thing is divided into past, present and the future, the time of the self gathers into it past, present and future as one whole. 'Thus he (man) is implicated in a process different from that which characterizes the change undergone by objects. The former involves decision, the latter involves only succession. In terms of this usage a mountain, a stone or a tree does not have a "history" in the strict sense . . . Decision enables him to accept the past in entering upon his destiny instead of having it laid upon him as an unalterable weight.'66 Heidegger, therefore, is of the view that the self does not exist in time but is constituted by the time-process. The Absolute moment, although finite, temporal process is realized in the resolved personal existence, for then the three phases of the process: past, present, and future, which rigidly exclude each other, are constantly held in the indissolubility of their union in interpretation .... I am myself temporal, not a being who exists in time.'67 Sartre's position also 'resembles Heidegger's discussion of temporality in pointing out that man's way of dealing with them is very different from physicist's notion of time. From one perspective my past is as much a part of my "factity" as any purely physical event . . . and I can relate past,

present and future just because I am never simply "myself" in the sense in which a tree is simply itself. And here is Marcel's conception of time as explained by David E, Roberts: 'Entering into this selfhood is at the opposite pole from trying to become an observer who watches the stream of experience flow past like a movie film. Thus becoming my true self involves two things: first, a point where my past and my future clasp hands in what might be called the "Absolute Moment"; here eternal meaning, though it transcends me, is neither static nor abstract, it is intimately personal and it is operative in time (i.e. real time). 69

Turning to Iqbal it is surprising to note not only the similarity of his views with those quoted above but also the similarity of language and terminology which he uses to put forward his conception of time. He says, 'A time-process cannot be conceived as a line already drawn. It is a line in the drawing—an actualization of open possibilities. It is purposive only in the sense that it is selective in character and brings itself to some sort of present fulfilment by actively preserving and supplementing the past.'70 Iqbal criticises the thinkers of Ash'arite school among Muslims and Newton among the European thinkers for advocating the seriality and unreality of time. 'Time according to the Asharites is a succession of individual "nows" .... The absurdity of this conclusion is due to the fact that they looked at the subject of their enquiry from a wholly objective point of view .... In our own time Newton described time as "something which in itself and from its own nature flows equally." The metaphor of stream implied in this description suggests serious objections to Newton's equally objective view of time. We cannot understand how a thing is affected on its immersion in this stream and how it differs from things that do not participate in its flow. Nor can we form any idea of the beginning, the end, the boundaries of time if we try to understand it on the analogy of a stream. '71 Iqbal approves of the view of time entertained by 'Iraqi among Muslim thinkers. He

explains 'Iraqi's view in these words: 'The time of gross bodies which arises from the revolution of heavens (i.e. succession of "nows") is divisible into past, present and future .... The time of immaterial bodies (like self) is also serial in character, but its passage is such that a whole year in the time of gross bodies is not more than a day in the time of an immaterial body.'72 Again, 'Mental and physical events are both in time, but the time-span of the ego is fundamentally different to the time-span of the physical event. The duration of the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact, the ego's duration is concentrated within it and linked with its present and future in a unique manner .... True time duration belongs to the ego alone.'73 To exist in pure duration is to be a self, and to be a self is to be able to say I am."74 'The time of the appreciative self is a single "now" which the efficient self in its traffic with the world of space pulverizes into a series of "nows" like a pearl in a thread '74

We can also compare the existentialist view of space as propounded by Heidegger with that of Iqbal. Both are against the Newtonian conception of space, according to which space is an absolute void in which things are situated. According to both of them, space is not something objective and absolute; rather it is dependent on the objects. Both hold a dynamic view of space.

H.J. Blackham explains Heidegger's view of space in the following words: 'The abstract geometric space of mathematical physics contrasts with the qualitative space of actual preoccupations which is inseparable from objects .... The conception of classical physics (in modern physics all spatial propositions refer solely to the behaviour of bodies, never to "space") has led to the popular conception of one thing amongst others in a space. This is a false conception of the world of objects, still more of *Dasein* (i.e. human individual). Their relations, spatial and others, are constitutive of the

#### Dasein and the things in the world.'76

Igbal propounds his view in the following words: 'Matter for common sense is something which persists in time and moves in space. But for modern relativity physics this view is no longer tenable. A piece of matter has become not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone .... The scientific view of nature as pure materiality is associated with the Newtonian view of space as an absolute void in which things are situated.'77 Igbal approves of Einstien's view of space with minor qualifications. He says, 'Einstien's theory is valuable in two ways. First it destroys not the objectivity of Nature, but the view of substance as simple location in space .... Substance for modern Relativity physics is not a persistent thing but a system of interrelated events. Secondly it makes space dependent on matter.'78 Therefore Iqual conceives of space as dynamic and intimately related with time. It is expanding and not static. He refutes the objectivity of time and space in the following verses, where he says that space like time is dependent on the individual's point of view:

[The intellect is the slave of absolute time and space, whereas there is neither (absolute) space, nor (absolute) time, Being and non-being are the result of my point of view; and time and space are creations of my own mind (Darb-i-Kalim).]

(10) This leads us to the consideration of the age-old bodymind

problem. Are body and mind two separate entities? If so, what is the nature of the relation between them? Is the human self the sum total of body and mind? The so-called modern European philosophy which had its origin in Descartes tended to believe in the duality of body and mind in the human self and various solutions of their relation were offered to this problem.

Some of the existentialists and Igbal are opposed to regarding the human self as the sum total of body and mind. They regard body and mind as only two aspects of one reality, call it self, ego or personality, 'Marcel, for example, challenges the whole mode of thinking that tries to regard mind and body as two "somethings" that must be related to each other. At the level of objective thinking there is no answer to the question of how I can be an incarnate self. For my body, in so far as it is mine, in the first instance is not an object. It is not other than myself in the way that the rest of the external world is. I cannot stand over against it as, I can stand over against objects except by an act of abstraction which does not really break the underlying unity ... Besides being something which I have, my body is also something which I am. Since it is not merely a possession or a tool, I cannot treat it merely as a means without treating my self and therefore selfhood, merely as a means.... This body is a person. What is more, it is not just any person, it is I.'79 The same Marcellian conception of body-mind relation can be expressed by using existentialist terminology: 'My body cannot merely be "there" for me, because it is through the body that other things become "there" for me. 280

Iqbal advocates the unity of body and mind in more clear words. He refutes Descartes' and Leibnitz's views about the bodymind relation and concludes: 'Thus parallelism and interactionism are both unsatisfactory. Yet mind and body become one in action .... The body is not a thing situated in an absolute void. It is a system of

events or acts. The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system of acts .... What then is matter? A colony of egos of low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order when their association and interaction reaches a certain degree of coordination. '81

[Calling body and mind as two distinct entities is hardly true.
Believing body and mind as two (things) is a sin.]

(11) No doubt in sciences like sociology, psychology, politics and so forth we make generalisations about human beings. We seem to understand human nature by means of concepts and universal statements that we derive through inductive methods. But that is done only for the sake of convenience. Human nature is inexhaustible. It is unique. Each individual is peerless, is single or alone. Therefore the generalisations about human nature may serve some useful purpose but to think that they furnish us the whole information regarding the personality or self of the individual will be totally wrong. The tendency in the modern materialistic era is towards treating a human being as only a unit, which may be substituted by another. Existentialists and Iqbal both fight against such a tendency and advocate the individuality and the uniqueness of man. They equally stress the importance of cultivating uniqueness and individuality.

Whether the existentialist is religiously motivated or not, he is characteristically one who comes to the defence of human freedom, uniqueness and self-transcendence.<sup>82</sup> For the existentialists the human being cannot be generalised into any one category. Jaspers and Marcel protest against the loss of individuality and uniqueness in the modern world; they protest against a man's social function as the prime measure of his true worth. 'The modern individual is only "one of a number," a replaceable unit, subject to technical manipulation and the levelling force of quantitative standards.<sup>83</sup>

'Existentialism has been tempted more than once to deny the theory of species or of human nature. Kierkegaard used to say that the relationship of individual man to God is higher and greater than his relationship to his species. He does not deny that the crowd—today, it would be called the "masses"—can have its value in its own way, but it is the individual alone who reached the goal as far as existence is concerned.'84 It means that as each individual occupies a unique position in the scheme of things, each one is personally and in his own way concerned with his redemption. No one can share anybody else's burden.

For Iqbal not only the human individual but also all life is unique and the concept of mechanism, according to him, is inapplicable to this phenomenon. So One of the important characteristics of the unity of the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of every ego. So The uniqueness of the human self is brought forth by Iqbal in clearer terms when he says, 'The Qur'an in its simple, forceful manner, emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of man, and has, I think, a definite view of his destiny as a unity of life. It is in consequence of this view of man as a unique individuality; which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden of another, and entitles him only to what is due to his own personal effort, that the Qur'an is led to reject the idea of redemption. So

We have seen how existentialists protest against the tendency of treating the individuals as mere functions in utter disregard of their uniqueness. The reason for this tendency is that the function side of man can easily be conceptualised. 'The individual tends to appear both to himself and to others as an agglomeration of functions,'88 says Marcel. Exactly in the same way does Iqbal protest against this tendency of equating human individual with functions. He deplores that in our daily intercourse 'we do not care to reach the inmost individuality of man. We treat them as mere functions, and approach them from those aspects of their identity which are capable of conceptual treatment,'89

If the individual is so unique and lives in his isolated solitude, how does he establish his contact with the other persons? Both existentialists and Iqbal face this problem and both furnish the same kind of answers.

"The problem of "other-person-ness" is one of the great conquests of Existentialism. Classical philosophy, strangely, used to leave it alone. If you enumerate the major problems dealt with by classical philosophy, you have knowledge, the outside world, myself, the soul, the body, the mind, God and the future life—the problem created by association with other people never assumes in classical philosophy the same importance as the other problems. At one stroke Existentialism has raised it to the central position. It will, of course, be pointed out that it had already been done by the various forms of sociology and collectivism which filled the nineteenth century. Naturally, the part they played was by no means small, but their attention was concentrated upon social organisation and not upon the nature of the connection between one man's existence and the next man's. They were based on the plan of objective communication, that form which is operated by means of accepted phraseology, institutions and technical direction.'90

What, therefore, is the existentialistic solution of this problem? According to these thinkers, the individual gets to know the other persons on the basis of the response that his actions arouse in them. Where the response is lacking the access to or association with the other person is not possible, even though he may be physically very near me. For example, a man in the same room with me may be so alien that I cannot feel his presence .... (Presence) calls for a response on our part, not a mere noticing. 91

Iqbal offers the same solution to this problem. He asks: 'How do we know other minds in our social intercourse?' He goes on to reply, 'We may say, after Professor Royce, that our fellows are known to be real because they respond to our signals .... Response is, no doubt, the test of the presence of a conscious self.'92

Whatever the importance and value of individuality and uniqueness, and of spirituality and inwardness, the human individual has his being in society. Social environment enables the individual to develop his inner possibilities. Therefore society is a medium for the development and not the retardation of the individual qualities. As such, both individualism and totalitarianism are wrong in their attitude towards the society. The former is wrong, for it aims at the eradication of society and leaving the individual alone in his struggle in the world. The latter is wrong because it does not recognise the worth of individual and makes society an instrument of suppression.

Jaspers and Marcel specially take this line of thought. According to Jaspers, human society is founded on the individuals. The individual in treating others as fellow-existents of equal worth, apart from contributing to the social reality, also perfects himself. Social intercourse is a means for the individual for the attainment of maturity and self possession. Marcel thinks that it is only within the 'We' that anyone ever becomes 'himself. The more my existence participates in that of others, the closer does it come to being and the more one falls into egocentricity, the less he exists. The individuals is the individual for the attainment of maturity and self possession.

Iqbal, as we have seen, advocates the primacy of the individual but at the same time he stresses the importance of the individual's life and participation in social life. In fact he wants to maintain a balance between man's life at the individual level and at the social level. Neither should the individual renounce society, nor society should crush the individual. Extreme forms of individualism and totalitarianism are both equally criticised by him. The following verses reflect his view of importance of society for the development of the individual.

[The relation of the individual with the group is a blessing; his nature and potentialities find realisation in the community (Asrar-i-Khudi),]

[The individual has his being in the relation he has with the society; outside the society he is a mere nonentity. A wave has meaning only in the context of the ocean; outside it is just nothing.]

[The individual gets his dignity through the community and the community has its organisation through the individual.]

## در دلش زوق نمو از لمت است اضاب کار او از لمت است

The individual is motivated to realise himself through the community, and his deeds are judged by (the norms of) the community.

The whole traditional philosophy falls into two broad groups on the question of the source of knowledge and the individual's coming into contact with the world, Being in general, God and himself. On one side we have the idealists and rationalists, who, whatever their theoretical differences, gave priority to the idea, the essence or the universal over the concrete. On the other side are the empiricists and the realists who no doubt turned to the concrete facts but missed the point by ignoring or totally eliminating the self or the individual by thinking it to be a sort of tabula rasa, receiving the outside impressions like a photographic plate. Kant who does not fall into any of these two groups found the gap between the knowing self and the object unbridgeable and declared the thing-in-itself as unknowable. Here the defect lay in subject-object dichotomy. Thus the whole traditional philosophy failed in its venture to solve the mighty epistemological problem. This state of affairs led to the mistrust of intellect in Bergson's philosophy on the one hand and hastened the rise and spread of Existentialism in Europe, on the other.

As Existentialism is basically opposed to all speculative and rationalistic systems, it invites us to the observation of the concrete facts. It is of utmost importance because the individual in making his choices and decisions must be personally related to his situations as actually obtaining in life. 'Because the senses are also operative in the existential judgement, metaphysics is grounded in actual, sensible being .... The initial apprehension of being is never attained in separation from particular, sensible instances of being. Hence

Marcel regards the sensible world as a gateway to the transcendent .... Metaphysics need no longer be described in Wolffian fashion, as a quest after the soul, the world and God, a trinity of ideal entities ungrounded in sensuous experience. In specifying the method of existential metaphysics as a concrete one, Marcel believes himself to be in opposition to the Thomistic theory of abstraction.... The various principles of Being entering into the structure of material and immaterial modes of being are noting other than the principles of concreteness, since finite being is realised only in individual, concrete acts of existing.'96 Marcel's version of Existentialism in this regard was influenced by Eergson's philosophy; from it he learnt to accept a stress on intuition.97 Marcel, like Bergson, bridges the gap between the subject and things-in-themselves by means of participation (Bergsonian intuition). In knowing the objects the individual participates in and enters into the objects-becomes one with them.

Existentialism diagnoses the causes of the failure and incompetency of the classical philosophy in the field of epistemology as the acceptance by it of the subject-object dichotomy. Therefore it 'hopes to by-pass a good many of the modern epistemological difficulties by criticising the dichotomy between subject and object. It furnishes more careful descriptions of the cognitive union between mind and being.'99

Iqbal also emphasises the importance of the concrete experience in contrast to speculative thought. Thus he writes: 'The first important point to note about the spirit of Muslim culture ... is that for purposes of knowledge, it fixes its gaze on the concrete, the finite. It is further clear that the birth of the method of observation and experiment in Islam was due not to a compromise with Greek thought but to a prolonged warfare with it. ... Knowledge must begin with the concrete.' 100 Iqbal criticises Ibn-i-Rushd for his propagation

of the Greek mode of thinking among the Muslims. 'Ibn-i-Rushd,' says Iqbal, 'lost sight of a great and fruitful idea in Islam and unwittingly helped the growth of that enervating philosophy of life which obscures man's vision of himself, his God and his world.'101 According to Iqbal, the supremacy of Islam over other cultures lies in the fact that it lays stress on the inductive method and on the sense-perception of facts. Whereas Islam forbids us not to speculate about the existence and nature of God, it invites us to have a glimpse of His existence and nature in the concrete experience of facts of the inner and outer world. Therefore Iqbal is of the view that intellect cannot give us a sure knowledge of reality as it regards its object as the other. Every act of human knowledge bilurcates what might, on proper inquiry, turn out to be a unity, into a self that knows and a confronting "other" that is known. That is why we are forced to regard the object that confronts the self as something existing in its own right, external to and independent of the self whose act of knowledge makes no difference to the object known.'102 'The mystic states brings us into contact with the total passage of Reality in which all the diverse stimuli merge into one another and form a single unity in which the ordinary distinction of subject and object does not xist.'103 Hence according to him the knowledge of the object is not possible without becoming one with it. That function is performed by intuition or thought in its deeper movement.

In the same way, according to existentialists and Iqbal, man's relation with God cannot be conceptualised. It must be a direct concrete living relation—a relation established on the basis of an inner experience, one in which the whole personality is involved. Thus in Marcel's view, 'This meeting with the Absolute "Thou" (beyond the self and beyond other people) takes place wholly in inwardness. God cannot be approached like an objectively existing thing or an objectively demonstrable principle because our bond with Him is ulterior to everything we can stand over against.' 104 'But

much modern philosophy makes the mistake of assuming that all knowledge must be similar to sensation where the knower is conscious but the "known" is a thing.' 105 In divine knowledge subject-object dichotomy disappears. One of the ways how the human self can get into a direct relationship with God is prayer. And according to Jaspers, 'It is a living relatedness to the Transcendent instead of talking about such a relationship. Thus prayer can mean the building up of one's strength through meditation ... seeking only an inward transfiguration and expecting no external results.' 106

Religious or divine experience has the same kind of significance for Igbal. Thus he says, 'In fact, it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience in religious life'107 'The main purpose of the Qur'an is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his manifold relations with God and the universe.'108 Our sense-perception does establish a relation between the individual and God but that is indirect. 'The other way is direct association with the Reality as it reveals itself within, '109 This association is possible through what, according to Igbal, 'the Our'an describes as Fu'ad or Qalb, i.e. heart .... The "heart" is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to the Qur'an, something which "sees," and its reports, if properly interpreted, are never false. We must not, however, regard it as mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part.'110 According to Igbal, the highest form of association with God or reality is prayer. 'In the act of prayer it (i.e. the mind) gives up its career as a seeker of slow-footed universality and rises higher than thought to capture Reality itself with a view to become [sic] a conscious participator in its life,'111 Thus the bond between the finite self and God is that of living participation, according to

Iqbal, and not a form of intellectual and conceptual relation.

However, Igbal's conception of prayer differs from that of Kierkegaard. Whereas Kierkegaard regards the relationship of man and God as strictly individual and personal, for Iqbal it is both individual and congregational. 'It is the individual alone,' says Kierkegaard, 'who reaches the goal.'112 In other words, 'religious experience and prayer en masse will be valueless. Here solitude appears not as an end, but as a necessary means for the concentration of thought .... Alone the individual can receive, understand and transmit truth.'113 But Igbal, on the contrary, is of the view that 'the real object of prayer, however, is better achieved when the act of prayer becomes congregational. The spirit of all true prayer is social. Only the hermit abandons the society of man in the hope of finding in a solitary abode the fellowship of God. A congregation is an association of men who, animated by the same aspiration, concentrate themselves on a single object and open up their inner selves to the working of a single impulse. It is psychological truth that association multiplies the normal man's power of perception, deepens his emotion, and dynamizes his will to a degree unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality.'114

Coming back from this digression we find both existentialists and Iqbal holding the inner experience to be incommunicable. The language which is shaped to convey the concepts of the physical objects is incapable of conveying the inner experience. Existentialists are 'keenly aware of the inadequacy of all language fashioned within the man-world correlation, whenever one attempts to characterize the "fullness" and "emptiness," the "allness" and the "emptiness" of ultimate reality. Near and hard to grasp is the God, says Holderlin, Heidegger's poet. According to existentialists the reason for the incommunicability of the inner experience is its uniqueness and unanalysability. In other words, the individual lives as it were in a

secret state of solitude.'115 Iqbal expresses the same view in these words" 'Since the quality of mystic experience is to be directly experienced, it is obvious that it cannot be communicated. ... The incommunicability of mystic experience is due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling untouched by discursive intellect.'116 'The fact, however, that religious experience is incommunicable does not mean that the religious man's pursuit is futile. Indeed, the incommunicability of Religious Experience gives us a clue to the ultimate nature of the ego. In our daily social intercourse we live and move in seclusion as it were.'117

Is the inner experience, call it mystic, religious or prophetic, a state which necessarily entails inactivity? Does the finite ego have a permanent repose in reality never returning to the world of concrete facts? Not necessarily, according to existentialists and Iqbal. Having found the truth in the inwardness, the individual has an urge for outwardness, i.e. for translating the experience into practice.

No doubt, great stress is laid on communion with God in Existentialism, 'but the stress is laid, not on the isolation of the subject, but on the intensity of the communion ... "the impassioned interest" he shares with God and, through Him, with beings and things. '118 Inwardness calls for a constant dialectical component of outwardness. To live intensely is to be exposed ... it represents courage to expose oneself. To live personally is to assume an everchanging situation and responsibilities and to reach out ceaselessly beyond the situation which has been attained .... The state of becoming a person involves a movement to extend beyond it .... In one sense spirituality is a total movement towards an outwardness and beyond myself.' According to Kierkegaard, the most remarkable thing about the man of faith is that after having renounced the finite and the temporal, he gets them back again. After breaking with the world he returns to the world. 120

For Iqbal it is the highest type of religious experience, i.e. the prophetic experience, which tends to translate itself into practice. The other levels of religious experience, e.g. the mystic experience, lack this tendency. When the mystic returns from his contact with reality it signifies almost nothing for others, but when the prophet returns it is highly significant for mankind. 'The mystic does not wish to return from the repose of "unitary experience," and when he returns as he must, his return does not mean much for mankind at large. The prophet's return is creative. He returns to insert himself in the sweep of time and thereby to create a fresh world of ideals.... The desire to see his religious life transformed into living worldforce is supreme in the prophet. ... In penetrating the impervious material before him the prophet discovers himself for himself and unveils himself to the eye of history.'121 Thus, according to Igbal, not all types of inner experience but only the prophetic experience has a tendency to find expression in the outside practical life.

(13) The next point in which a marked similarity is found in the views of the existentialists and Iqbal is the importance they attach to the freedom of the human individual. Being a human individual is synonymous with being free. They believe neither in determinism nor in indeterminism, nor even in pre-determinism. They rather believe in self-determinism.

In Jaspers' view, an individual is not simply a bundle of causal sequence. 'He can differentiate himself from every social role even when because of cultural conditioning it is impossible to discard the role. Even character, which when once built up one cannot wholly escape, is not something given as a pure datum; it is something we have a hand in making and for which we feel responsible.' <sup>122</sup> He adds that this freedom can be ignored and evaded but can never be effaced so long as man remains human. <sup>123</sup> Freedom is fundamentally the ability to choose oneself, and it does not consist in

one particular choice; it is 'a continual struggle.'

The freedom of the human individual, the existentialists speak of, is teleological, creative and dynamic. It is a summons to action. 'There is a need to be fulfilled or a possibility to be realised and therefore the motivation comes from the future ... Motives cannot operate except in connection with projection, and I am the source of the projection. Therefore to hold that human motives and ends can be exhaustively accounted for by referring to Nature or society or God is to treat man as if he were a thing.'124 This is Sartre's view according to whom man is not determined by any of the outside factors or fate. The environmental influences do not shape the destiny of man; they only provide motivation for the application of free will. 'The conditioning factors of life undeniably supply raw material for motivation and for projecting ends, they furnish the situations, the setting in which man exists ... If man were identical with the sum of his conditioning, he would never act.'125 The existentialists do not deny that in a sense man is 'made,' as a thing in the world by heredity, childhood experiences, habits, family, class, nation or culture. 'These physical, biological and psychological factors constitute my situation, but cannot make me identical with my situation.'126 According to Heidegger, 'the human being is not what the eternal and immutable law of nature has decreed that he should be; he is what he has decided to be (self-determination). He could not, therefore, rightly be fitted into any abstract definition or mode to conform with any nature anterior to his existence, he is his existence, he is what he makes himself,'127 Freedom, according to Jaspers, is based on creativity. We are free in so far as we can handle circumstances creatively. We shape our own ends and then pursue them. Marcel also criticises both determinism and indeterminism. Against the former he points out that it is possible for a person under conditions of captivity to retain and even to deepen inner freedom, despite the fact that obviously he cannot do what he wants.

He also insists that in as much as many desires are compulsive, freedom may require a certain conquest over them instead of conformity to them. Against indeterminism he points out that it presents a radically defective view of freedom because it gives rise to the notion that the purest examples of liberty are to be found in circumstances where the stakes are insignificant. It is only in such circumstances that the reasons for choosing one way or the other are not compelling. Whatever a man does he only expresses his self. <sup>128</sup> For Kierkegaard, freedom consists in the free obedience to law and God. 'Freedom,' according to him, 'involves spiritual dependence and it is perfect obedience to God. <sup>129</sup>

On turning to Iqbal we find that he holds the same views on the freedom of will. He is more consistent and systematic in his exposition of this view than existentialists are. He, like existentialists, attacks both deterministic (or mechanistic) and indeterministic views of life. Self-determinism is the only view he finds tenable. B.A. Dar explains Iqbal's view on freedom of the will thus: 'According to Iqbal the power of free choice is not a free gift of God; it is to be attained after a hard struggle. With the growth in us of the capacity to overcome obstacles in the attainment of our objects, the power to exercise freedom will develop. Human self appears to be conditioned on all sides by the physical universe which limits the expression of its freedom ... (The ego) reaches further freedom only when it is able to act in a creative way. It no longer remains mastered by a world of law and necessity.' 130

Explaining self-determinism, Iqbal writes: 'Thus the element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity clearly shows that the ego is a free personal causality.' <sup>131</sup> So Iqbal is basically opposed to the view of mechanistic causation. The cause of an individual's actions or choices does not lie in the past; rather it lies ahead in the future. But the future causation or teleological causation is not

something already fixed, for that will mean pre-determinism or fatalism and Igbal is equally against these forms of determinism. 'And the future is given to it (the ego) not as lying before, yet to be traversed; given only in the sense that it is present in its nature as an open possibility. It is time regarded as an organic whole that the Qur'an describes as Tagdir or the destiny ... Destiny is time regarded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities. It is time freed from the net of causal sequence..... The destiny of a thing then is not n unrelenting fate working from without like a task master; it is the inward reach of a thing, its realizable possibilities which lie within the depths of its nature, and serially actualize themselves without any feeling of external compulsion.'132 Just as for existentialists, existence is freedom, so Igbal too regards life as another name for freedom, 'From our conscious experience we have seen that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands.'133 Iobal, like Kierkegaard, conceives the highest form of freedom as a voluntary obedience to the Divine Will. Thus he writes:

[Only dead matter and plants are the slaves of fate; the man of faith (voluntarily) obeys only the laws of God (Darb-i-Kalim).]

Another point of interest in connection with the freedom of the individual which is equally stressed by the extentialists and Iqbal is the notion of risk involved in a free act. A single decision may make or mar the entire career of an individual, nay of the whole mankind. The most important feature of being an individual subject is that a

man is personally concerned about his own existence, and can come to terms with what he is only by coming to terms with his possibilities. Because a man can take decisions with reference to these possibilities, he can either gain or lose his true self.'134 'Thus the individual who is not responsible for being or for being conscious, and who is hedged about by nature, society, other individuals and death must nevertheless take sole responsibility for whatever meaning life may have .... The individual, without help from outside sources, must take upon himself the burden of all mankind.'135 One can achieve true egobood, or what existentialists call authenticity, only by making decisions and taking risks. 136 It is this risk and responsibility involved in the decisions that man makes in this world which to a great extent are beyond his ken and control that give rise to anguish. Man, for this reason, is in a tragic situation and in anguish. He is so insignificant, it appears, and yet he shoulders such a heavy responsibility!

Iobal too views freedom as a great responsibility and a risk. 'Freedom is ... a condition of goodness. But to permit the emergence of a finite ego who has the power to choose, after considering the relative values of several courses of action open to him, is really to take a great risk; for the freedom to choose good involves the freedom to choose what is the opposite of good.'137 According to Iqbal, man is the trustee of free personality which he accepted at his own peril. 138 'the consequences of the human freedom of will are tragic for 'the mutual conflict of opposing individuality is the worldpain which both illuminates and darkens the temporal career of life. In the case of man in whom individuality deepens into personality, opening up possibilities of wrong-doing, the sense of the tragedy of life becomes much more acute. But the acceptance of selfhood as a form of life involves the acceptance of all the imperfections that flow from the finitude of selfhood. The Qur'an represents man as having accepted at his peril the trust of (free) personality which the heavens

and earth and the mountains refused to bear.'139

Therefore the existentialists and Iqbal regard free will as a privilege as well as a responsibility for the human individual.

(14) The traditional mode of thinking had assigned a distinguished position to the man of wisdom, the one who had retired from the work-a-day world into the world of eternal ideas. Thus the fighters and the workers occupied a lowly place in the ideal society of Plato, the highest position being allotted to those who were given to abstract speculation and philosophising.

But existentialists and Iqbal both regard this mode of thinking as erroneous. The man who actually fights the battle of life is superior to the one who worships an abstract truth in a secluded corner. They emphasise the importance of decision and deed. The true selfhood, or what the existentialists call authentic existence, cannot be achieved unless one faces the concrete situation in life by taking decisions and performing deeds. Not speculative thought but decision and deed are the necessary conditions for achieving true selfhood.

Jaspers is of the view that true selfhood cannot be achieved through the cultivation of inwardness by renouncing the participation in political and social struggle; it requires action in history at the level of empirical events. 140 The self, the 'I am,' according to Heidegger, is inseparable from decision and deed. 141 He thinks that the foundation of authentic existence is the individual's capacity to make resolves and to take decision. 142 Sartre goes to the extent of saying that 'there is no longer any reality except reality in action.' Man is nothing more nor less than the sum total of his acts. Life has no a priori meaning; it is up to each and every one of us, by living, to give it some meaning. 143 And Nietzsche stresses this point when he writes: 'Deeds, above all, and in pride of place, deeds. That is to say

performance, and more performance, and more performance. You may rest assured that faith which is a constituent of performance, will be secured by practice.' Therefore to live personally is to assume an ever-changing situation and responsibilities. The first step in philosophy, according to existentialists, so Mounier tells us, is a call to action. In the classical philosophy, Mounier deplores, 'the professor had dethroned the hero and the saint.' In the classical philosophy according to existentialists, so Mounier deplores, the professor had dethroned the hero and the saint.' In the classical philosophy according to existentialists, so Mounier deplores, the professor had dethroned the hero and the saint.' In the classical philosophy according to existentialists.

Iqbal, too, both in his Lectures and in his poetry, stresses the conative and active side of personality. He attaches more importance to resolve, decision and above all to deeds and actions. 'The Qur'an,' he says, 'is a book which emphasizes "deed" rather than "idea" 148

[!t is the deed which makes or mars life; it is the deed which leads one either to heaven or to hell. This mortal (man) is by nature neither good nor bad.]

Iqbal also, like existentialists, deplores that:

Abstract philosophy is detachment from life,

(15) We can also compare the existentialists' attitude towards the external world and the objects therein with that of Iqbal. Both affirm the reality of the external world and both regard the differentiated things as the creation of our interests and purposes.

Jaspers' starting-point, for example, is a solid affirmation of the

reality of the external world. 149 According to Iqbal, Islam says 'yes' to the world of matter and points the way to master it with a view to discovering a basis for a realistic regulation of life. 150

And regarding the nature of things it is interesting to refer to Heidegger's analysis of the external world into utensils, i.e. things as they are encountered and disposed of by the individual in daily life, instead of by the phenomena of nature as described by science. Thus he recognises the fact that man is primarily concerned with external things as they affect his interests and needs. <sup>151</sup> Iqbal expresses the same view about the nature of things in the following words: '... things are not given in immediate experience as things already possessing definite contours; for immediate experience is a continuity without any distinction in it. What we call things are events in the continuity of nature which thought spatializes and thus regards as mutually isolated for purposes of action.' <sup>152</sup>

(16) The traditional philosophers' love for system-building resulted in the cleavage between life and thought in their philosophy. Their thought was not the expression of their true belief, their inner life. One reason for this state of affairs was that philosophy had all along been interested in problems which had no or little bearing on life itself. They were more interested in the definitions and the bare concepts of the problems of Divine Existence, truth, freedom, death and so forth. In other words, these problems never became basic and inner concern of the philosophers, or we can say their thought was detached from their existence.

Existentialists and Iqbal in their own characteristic ways express their mistrust of such abstract mode of thinking. Philosophy and all thinking, according to them, ought not to be just the products of one's mind; they must contain and express the inner concern of an individual. One's philosophy ought to be one's vocation, where one's whole life is at stake. In short, the philosopher himself ought to be

personally involved in the philosophy he produces. The existentialists 'are not in the slightest degree interested in purveying a set of findings like the answers to arithmetic problems, which can be found at the back of the book. Rather they are interested in arousing the reader to a spiritual struggle. Hence the result of this philosophy is what it does to you.... The most significant thing, they feel, is a change in man-his motives, feelings, and hoped-instead of an increase in his fund of knowledge. Such a method constitutes an explicit protest against traditional philosophizing by insisting that the personal commitments of a thinker be incorporated into his definition of truth ... Ordinarily the student of philosophy assumes that this task is to master certain concepts and to get them straightened out rationally so that they will be free from inconsistency. He hopes thereby to arrive eventually at an explanation of nature, man and God. But Existentialism passionately protests that the truly great questions of life cannot really be answered by means of scientific information plus clear thinking. For example, I may learn and accept certain theories of immortality without moving one step towards fitness for eternal life.'153 Existentialism calls us to the most basic and inner problems, and, more important, it bids each individual thinker wrestle with these problems until he has grown into personal authenticity. 154 The existentialists insist that in connection with ultimate matter it is impossible to lay aside the concerns of the human individuals. In the search for ultimate truth the whole man, and not only his intellect or reason, is caught up and involved. He must live the truth he sees. The existentialists differentiate between 'knowing about' the truth in some theoretical detached way and 'being grasped' by the truth in a decisively personal manner. 155

Pascal maintains that the important thing is not so much truth as the attitude towards truth. Kierkegaard and Jaspers also stress this point. They believe that without the inward attitude, knowledge is acquired in vain. 156 According to Collins, the existentialists believe in Fichte's motto that we ought to philosophise out of our need for redemption.

Iqbal is convinced that the traditional philosophy necessarily leads to the detachment of thought from life. Thus he says:

[The shell of Hegel's (thought) is empty of the pearl (of reality). The whole charm of his (system) is all an illusion. Intellect is incapable of leading us to reality. Philosophy leads one to detachment from life.]

That is why he believes that only religion can become the real concern of man, 'since the transformation and guidance of man's inner and outer life is the essential aim of religion .... Religion is not a departmental affair ... it is an expression of the whole man.' Religion has its own metaphysics and it is the metaphysics of what is of real concern to man. 'Science can afford to ignore metaphysics altogether ... but the religious expert who seeks to discover his personal status in the constitution of things cannot, in view of final aim of his struggle, be satisfied with ... a mere "as if." In so far as the ultimate nature of reality is concerned nothing is at stake in the venture of science; in the religious venture the whole career of the ego, as an assimilative personal centre of life and experience, is at stake.' 158 As a matter of fact in philosophising the ultimate aim of the ego ought not to be seeing something or understanding something but to be something. 159

Therefore the knowledge which does not affect the personality of the thinker is dangerous. It is useful only if it leads to inner enlightenment and transformation.

[If knowledge affects one only externally it is as poisonous as a snake. If it affects the heart (i.e. the inner personality) it is a useful friend.]

Iqbal believes that the philosophy that does not spring from the inmost recesses of the self and is not the true expression of the inner life of the thinker, is hopeless:

[The philosophy which has not been written in the heart's blood is either dead or is likely to die.]

Further, Iqbal, like the existentialists, believes that the man of faith, the man who, in existentialistic language, has grown in personal authenticity, in seeking knowledge achieves inward transformation. He assimilates the knowledge that he gathers:

[Nobody knows this secret that the man of faith seems to be just a reader of the Qur'an, whereas as a matter of fact he himself becomes the Qur'an (by inward transformation).]

### IV

In the foregoing pages an attempts has been made to show that marked affinity of thought does exist between the existentialists and Iqbal in many points. The points of resemblance have been substantiated by reproducing quotations from the writings of existentialists and from those of Iqbal. But it must be admitted at the same time that on many issues a fundamental difference of view can be traced between the existentialists and Iqbal which is undertaken in the next chapter.

#### · NOTES

- Here reference is made to Sophism with its slogan: 'Man is the measure of all things.'
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- 4. Ibid.
- 5. Ibid.
- Davids E. Roberts, Existentialsim and Religious Belief (Edited by Rogers Hazelton, Oxford University Press, New York, 1957), p. 189.
- 7. Ibid., p. 150.
- James Collins, The Existentialists (Henry Requery Company, Chicago, 1252), 195.
- 9. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p.2.
- 10. David E Roberts, op. cit, 312.
- Mohammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Shaikh Muhammad-Ashraf, Lahore, 1954), p. 4.
- 12. Ibid, p.128.

- 13. Ibid., p. 131.
- 14. H.J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 44.
- 15. Emmanuel, Mounier, op. cit, p.127.
- 16. Ibid., p. 20.
- Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific, Postscript, p. 275.
- 18. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 151.
- 19. Ibid., p. S.
- 20. Ibid., p. 2.
  - 21. Ibid., p. 3.
  - 22. Ibid., p. 150.
  - 23. Iqbal, Bang-e-Dara.
  - 24. David E. Robert, op. cit., pp. 282-83.
- 25. Ibid., p. 333.
- 26. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 151.
- 27. 11.J. Blackham, op. cit., p. 45.
- 28. David E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 309.
- 29. Ibid, p.6.
- 30. Iqbal,op. cit., pp. 41-42.
- 31. lbid., op. cit., pp. 2-3.
- 32. H.J., Blackham, op. cit., p. 88.
- 33. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 9.
- 34. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 46.
- 35. Ibid, p. 48.
- 36. Ibid., p. 47.
- 37. David E.Roberts, op cit., p. 4.
- 33. H.J. Blackham, op. cit., p. 2.
- 39. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 198.
- 40. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 11.
- 41. Ibid., p. 12.
- 42. Davids E. Roberts. op. cit., p. III.
- 43. Ibid., p. 243.
- 44. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 150.
- 45. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
- 46. James Collins, op. cit., p. 196.
- 47. Iqbal., op. cit., p. 98.
  - 48. Cf. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 235-6.
  - 49. Ibid., p. 152.
  - 50. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 116.
  - 51. Ibid, p. 11.
  - 52. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 255.

- 53. Ibid., p. 245.
- 54. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 105.
- 55. Ibid, p. 3.
- 56. Cf.Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 320.
- 57. Iqbal, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
- 58. Emmanuel Munier, op. cit., p. 29.
- 59. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit, p. 157.
- 60. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 54.
- 61. Cf. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 312.
- 62. Soren, Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 288.
- 63. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 122.
- 64. Ibid., p. 119.
- 65. Davids E.Roberts op. cit.p.158.
- 66. Ibid., p. 159.
- 67. H.J. Blackhman, op cit., pp. 99-100.
- 68. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 204.
- 69. Ibid., p. 307.
- 70. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 55.
- 71. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
- 72. Ibid. p. 75.
- 73. Ibid., p. 99.
- 74. Ibid., p. 56.
- 75. Ibid., p. 48.
- 76. H.J. Blackham, op. cit., pp. 89-90.
- 77. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 34.
- 78. Ibid., p. 38.
- 79. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 302-03.
- 80. Ibid., p. 311.
  - 81. Iqbal, op. cit., pp. 105-6.
  - 82. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 334.
  - 83. James Collins, op. cit., p. 84.
- 84. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
  - 85. Cf. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 44.
  - 86. Ibid., p. 99.
  - 87. Ibid, p. 95.
  - 88. G. Marcel, op. cit., p. 1.
  - 89. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 72.
  - 90. Emmanul Mounier, op. cit., p. 72.
  - 91. Davids, E. Robert, op. cit., p. 308.
  - 92. lqbal, op. cit., p. 19.
  - 93. Cf. Jaspers, Philosophy, pp. 338, 622.

94. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 308.

95. Ibid., p. 312.

96. James Collins, op. cit., p. 200.

97. David Roberts, op. cit., p. 279.

98. James Collins, op. cit., p. 29.

99. Ibid., p. 67.

100. Iqbal, op. cit., 131

101. Ibid., p. 4.

102. Ibid., p. 31.

103. Ibid., p. 18.

104. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 309.

105. Ibid, p. 285.

106. Ibid, p. 265.

107. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 25.

108. Ibid., p. 9.

109. lbid., p. 15.

110. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

111. Ibid., p. 90.

112.S. Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 97.

113. Ibid., p. 97.

114. Iqbal, op. cit, p. 92.

115. Cf. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 41.

116. Iqbal., op. cit., pp. 20-21.

117. Ibid, p. 183.

118.Cf. S. Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 97.

119. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 53.

120. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 70.

121. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 124.

122. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 236.

123. Cf. ibid., p. 236.

124. Ibid., p. 209.

125. Ibid., p. 210.

126. Ibid., p. 213.

127. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 29.

128. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 317.

129. Ibid, pp. 65-66.

130.B.A. Dar, A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1994), p. 202.

131. Igbal, op. cit., p. 202.

132. lbid., pp. 49-50.

133. Ibid., p. 54.

134. David E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 150.

135. Ibid., p. 213.

136. E. Mounier, op. cit, p. 34.

137. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 85.

138. Ibid, p. 95.

139. Ibid., p. 88.

140. Cf. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit, p. 243.

141. Ibd., p. 235.

142. Ibid., p. 137.

143. Emmanuel Mounier op. cit., p. 100.

144. Nietzsche Aurora, p. 22.

145. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 53.

146. Ibid., p. II.

147. Ibid., p. 8.

148. Iqbal, op. cit., p.iii.

149. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 235.

150. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 10.

151. Cf. Davids E. Roberts, op. citd., p. 151.

152. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 51

153. Davids E. Roberts, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

154. Ibid., p.4

155. Ibid.

156. Emmanuel Mounier, op. cit., p. 12.

157. Iqbal, op.cit., p.2.

158. Ibid., pp. 184-85.

159.p. 198.

# IQBAL AND EXISTENTIALISM - POINTS OF DIFFERENCE

No doubt Iqbal has much in common with existentialists, yet it cannot be denied that the two philosophies—existentialism and Iqbal's system—are at variance with each other in many vital aspects. While comparing the one with the other two important things must be kept in mind. First, existentialism is basically a philosophy of revolt and as such tends to promote negativism and extremism. Secondly, Iqbal drives his inspiration essentially and primarily from the Holy Qur'an which gives mankind a positive outlook. Islam teaches us moderation and cautions us against extremism of one form or the other. An action based on the spirit of moderation is judged to be the best action by both the Qur'an and the Hadith. Differences that there are between existentialists and Iqbal spring, in the final analysis, from this basic divergence of outlooks.

The first important point of difference between the two is the one regarding the idea of evolution. Whereas in Iqbal's system this notion occupies an important place, existentialists seem on the whole almost to shelve it either because they consider it too commonplace a subject to need an elaborate discussion or, and this is more important, they do not believe in the reality of the group and race. For them what matters is the individual.

No doubt, both Igbal and existentialists refer to the

occasion of man's gaining consciousness or rather self-consciousness. In Iqbal's philosophy man's gaining self-consciousness is occasioned by transition from animal state to the human state that once occurred in the history of the human race. It indeed is one of the greatest landmarks in the process of evolution. For existentialists, on the contrary, the moment of gaining consciousness is the occasion when the individual meets himself to be already there; they do not speak of a stage of transition from the animal state to the state of manhood.

Existentialists as well as Iqbal emphasise the freedom of human individual but there is a basic difference in their approach to his subject. Existentialists stand for an unlimited liberty of the human individual to the extent that it turns out to be licence. Sartre, for example, does not see a third possibility between total determinism and perfect indeterminism. Thus he writes in *Being and Nothingness*, 'Either man is wholly determined... or else man is wholly free.<sup>1</sup> Sartre easts his vote in favour of total indeterminism. Man, according to him, is indetermined to the extent that his volition is conditioned neither by heredity nor by environment, nor by any goal, nor by traditional values. He creates his own value in every action. Since every action has a uniqueness, no readymade ethical code can be of any help in guiding our moral conduct. As many critics have observed, this sort of freedom is in reality its own negation.

To reach somewhere a man must not only be free to move but must also have a goal or purpose. In other words, he is determined by the goal he pursues. Since the ends pursued by man

J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness (English translation by Hazel E. Barnes), Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p. 442.

are the projections of his own inner self or character, he is essentially determined by his own character. Thus a more reasonable view of human freedom is that of self-determinism and it is the one advocated by lqbal. According to him, '.... the element of guidance and directive control in the ego's activity clearly shows that the ego is a free personal causality.'2 Again he writes, '...to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands.... But there is a system in the continuity of this passage. Its various stages, in spite of the apparently abrupt changes in our evaluation of things, are organically related to one another. The life-history of the individual is, on the whole, a unity and not a mere series of mutually ill-adapted events.'3 These quotations from Igbal amply show that his conception of the freedom of the human self is opposed to the view held by existentialists, particularly by Sartre and Heidegger. And so it must be, for existentialists, notably the atheistic existentialists, do not believe in any system of values, ethics and religion, while Iqbal insists on a faithful obedience of the divine law.

According to Sartre, human freedom, nay human life itself, is absurd. The character of Sartre's 'in-itself' as well as of 'for-itself' is such that neither the former nor the latter can be accounted for in terms of reason. Life just happens. Why and what for? Nobody knows. Thus human existence or life is absurd. Man has no say in the

Iqual, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Oxford University Press, 1934, p. 102.

<sup>3.</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

matter and is simply to accept life as given. He is free but is not free to be not free. Life and freedom both are equally purposeless.

Iqbal draws his inspiration essentially from the Holy Qur'an which says, "We have not created the heavens and the earth and whatever is between in sport: We have not created them but for a scrious end: but the greater part of them understand it not" (44:38), Again, the Holy Qur'an tells us, "Verily in the creation of the Heavens and of the earth, and in the succession of the night and of the day, are signs for men of understanding; who, standing and sitting and reclining, bear God in mind and reflect on the creation of the Heavens and of the earth and say: 'Oh, our Lord! Thou hast not created this in vain': (3.188)" Against the existentialists, Iqbal thus believes that life is through and through purposive and has specific ends to fulfil. Each human individual life has a unique significance of its own. Man has to play a vital role in the scheme of things. Edowed with freedom he is to be the deputy or coworker of God in the creation of a new universe.

Existentialists make much of the psychological states of guilt, anguish and despair. This, all in all, a gloomy view of life is principally the outcome of their peculiar notion of human freedom as well as of peculiar analysis of the situation of man in the world. Man does not will the time or place of his birth, i.e. in a particular family and in a particular environment. Nor does he have any choice with regard to his physical or mental abilities and aptitudes. When he gains consciousness he meets himself to be already there. He does not know why he is there or what his destiny in this world is. He is simply to accept himself and his situation. All the same he alone is

Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>5.</sup> lbid.

to shoulder the responsibility of all the evil tendencies in him and the evil consequences of his decisions and deeds. He lives in an alien world, for he has no real knowledge about it. He cannot foresee the consequences of his actions and yet his fate, nay the fate of the entire world, rests on the decision he takes in a particular situation. The strange predicament in which man is placed leads the existentialists to the view that man suffers from an inescapable sense of guilt before God and the consequent despair and anguish. This sense of guilt is obviously rooted in the Christian doctrine that man is born with an original sin. No wonder that existentialism as a philosophy paints a gloomy picture of man's life in the world and spreads on the whole a diseased outlook. This also explains the queer concept of human freedom which the existentialists advocate. Igbal, on the contrary, is the exponent of the philosophy of hope and aspiration. He takes into consideration the existence both of good and evil in the world; but he is the champion neither of rosy optimism nor of morbid pessimism. He criticises these extreme views in the following words: 'To the optimist Browning all is well with the world; to the pessimist Schopenhauer the world is one perpetual winter where a blind will expresses itself in the infinite variety of living things which bemoan their emergence for a moment and then disappear for ever. The issue thus raised between optimism and pessimism cannot be finally decided at the present stage of our knowledge of the universe. Our intellectual constitution is such that we can take only a piecemeal view of things. We cannot understand the full import of the great cosmic forces which work havoc, and at the same time sustain and amplify life. The teaching of the Quran, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces, is neither optimism nor

pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognizes a growing universe and is animated by the hope of the man's eventual victory over evil.'6. This meliorism of Iqbal is to be found in a large number of his verses which give us the message of hope and a new level of aspiration.

[You should not become contented with the world of matter with its sweet smelling multi-coloured flowers: there are gardens and nests elsewhere too. Don't be lost in the world of serial time there are other forms of time and space for you.]

[Even the stars are afraid of the rise of man, lest this broken star (i.e., the incomplete man) may become full moon (i.e., the complete man).]

Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religions Thought in Islam, Oxford University Press 1934, p. 77.

## حیات ذوق سفر کے سوا کھھ اور نہیں

[Your destination is beyond any destination; life is nothing but a desire for an unending journey.]

Religious existentialists hold that the true mode of prayer is offering it in the privacy of one's self rather than saying it in congregation or assembly. In order really to be able to pray, an individual, they believe, is to concentrate on and sink into the inwardness of his soul. This is possible only in privacy and not in congregation. Man being alone, he alone is responsible before God; he can pray to God in loneliness only. While dwelling on communion with God existentialists always speak of the 'I-Thou' relationship and never of the 'We-Thou' relationship.

While Iqbal is not averse to an individual's praying in privacy he attaches greater importance to congregational prayer. 'The real object of prayer,' he writes, 'is better achieved when the act of prayer becomes congregational. The spirit of all true prayer is social ... A congregation is an association of men who, animated by the same aspiration, concentrate themselves on a single object and open up their inner selves to the working of a single impulse.'7 As against the existentialists' view that congregational prayer obstructs concentration of mind Iqbal observes, 'It is a psychological truth that association multiplies the normal man's power of perception. deepens his emotions and dynamizes his will to a degree unknown to him in the privacy of his individuality.'8 The congregational prayer, according to Iqbal, serves one very important purpose, which the existentialists ignore: it is a means for the eradication of statusconsciousness among the members of a community. Iqbal says,'... its form in general creates and fosters the sense of social equality

<sup>7.</sup> Ibid, p. 87

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

inasmuch as it tends to destroy the feeling of rank or race superiority in the worshippers.<sup>9</sup>

In this connection a fallacy of existentialism becomes evident. On the one hand the existentialists bemoan the tendency of self-estrangement among men and the tendency of estrangement from God; on the other, by preaching a morbid type of religious individualism they advocate estrangement from fellow-beings. Iqbal, an adherent of the philosophy of the Qur'an, has evolved a system in which the individual, the society and God are given due place.

In the field of political theory too, existentialists stand for an extreme form of individualism which if practised in its true form would lead to a state of anarchy. On the contrary, Iqbal holds a balanced view in this respect. He is opposed to over-organisation and totalitarianism: his ideal State gives enough liberty to the individual to cultivate his potentialities. All the same Iqbal insists that an individual can realise his potentialities only in a social order. The individual and society are indispensable to each other.

[The individual gets his dignity through the community and th community has its organisation through the individual.]

<sup>9.</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

[The relation of the individual with the group is a blessing for him; his nature and potentialities find realisation through the community].

[The individual has his being in relation to society; outside the society he is a mere nonentity. A wave has significance only in the crean; outside of it, it is just nothing.]



## **IOBAL ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS**

While going through poetical works and other writings of Iqbal, one thing that we cannot remain without noticing is that he had a deep awareness of social problems faced by Muslims in general and Indian Muslims in particular. Though volumes upon volumes have been written on all other aspects of Iqbal's thought, yet so far as I know, no writer on Iqbal has, thus far, touched upon his thinking on social problems. Here I shall attempt to pin-point those social problems which seem to have influenced Iqbal's thought and feelings. I do not claim that my thesis is based on the discovery of any new verses or writings of Iqbal. However, his verses and writings, often quoted in other contexts, have been interpreted in a new light.

Before going headlong into the issue of Iqbal and Social Problems, let us try to get a clear idea of the term "social problems".

A ren wned American sociologist, Professor Samuel Koenig of Brooklyn College, City University of New York, in his book entitled Sociology: An Introduction to the Science of Society, has defined the term "social problems" in these words: "They are situations or conditions which society regards as threats to its established ways or to its well-being and, therefore, needing to be alleviated or eliminated. "He further says: "What is considered a social problem by one society may not be so regarded by another. Because of changed conditions and attitudes what is thought to be a problem to-day may not have been thought to be one in the past, or vice versa, even in the same society. On the other hand there are social problems, which, as shown by historical records and surveys of different societies, are universal and permanent.... For this reason, many of the social problems of to-day are identical with those of

ancient times."

Lawrence K. Frank, another sociologist, in his article on "Social Problems," published in *The American Journal of Sociology*, defined a social problem as "any difficulty or misbehavior of a fairly large number of persons which we wish to remove or correct". According to Harold A. Phelps, "Every society has norms of what constitutes material well-being, physical health, mental health, and group and personal adjustment. Deviations from these norms are regarded as abnormalities and as constituting social problems." Professor John F. Cuber, of Ohio State University, in his book *Sociology: A Synopsis of Principles*, has enumerated some of the social problems which are slavery, poverty, racial or religious discrimination, caste exploitation of the underprivileged, crime, juvenile delinquency, etc.

Here let us pause and have a look at the moment in history when Iqbal was born, because no discussion on Iqbal and social problems can be fruitful unless we comprehend the political and social situation obtaining at his birth and during his lifetime. A thinker and reformer, after all, is the product of his times, not in the sense that his thinking and behaviour is mechanically caused by external and environmental conditions, but in the sense that they are the result of a conscious and voluntary response to such conditions.

Iqbal was born in the year 1877 and it will be recalled that the tragic and traumatic event of 1857 was still fresh in the memory of the Indian Muslims. They had lost their sovereignty and independence, and were subjugated by an alien power. Muslim society had been completely shaken on account of this upheaval. In the general massacre ordered by the victorious Britishers five hundred thousand Indians, mostly Muslims, were slaughtered in retaliation for the killing of only seven thousand men of the British army, during the uprising. Peoplé were hunted in the streets.

Muslims were hanged on thoroughfares and their dead bodies thrown into rivers. They were sewn in the swine's hides and burnt alive. Some of them were blown in the cannons. In Delhi twenty Muslim princes were hanged on a single day. The English army looted houses and shops. Magnificent buildings and market-places around the Red Fort were razed to the ground. The Jamia'h Mosque of Delhi was desecrated by the English army for full five years. During this period the mosque remained in their possession. In fact, the failure of the War of Independence and breaking down of the resistance movements had completely disspirited and demoralised the Muslims. The Hindus joined hands with the victorious rulers and persecuted the Muslims. Despair and pessimism had become the general mood. The Muslim society as a whole was passing through a period of turmoil and transformation. It gave rise to a number of social problems. As time passed these social problems continued to multiply and became more complex. To mention only a few, these social problems were: slavery and the resultant slavish mentality, gradual alienation from Islam and weakening of faith, pessimism and negativism, Hindu-Muslim tension, exploitation of the poor Muslim peasantry by the rich Hindu money-lenders, ouslaught of the alien cultural and ideological influences, sectarianism and the emergence of the self-proclaimed religious Messiahs, etc., etc.

This brief survey of the political and social situation at the time of Iqbal's birth makes it abundantly clear that it was not merely by chance that during this particular period a good number of the heroes of our history, social and political reformers, were either engaged in the struggle to tackle the social and political problems which had arisen in the wake of the defeat in the War of Independence, or took birth and imbibed the crusading spirit from the stalwarts of the elder generation. Maulana Shibli, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Nawab Viqarul Mulk and Nawab Muhsinul Mulk belong to the first category, while Maulana Muhammad 'Ali Jauhar, Maulana

Shaukat 'Ali, Nawab Bahadur Yar Jang, Qa'id-i A'zam Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah and 'Allamah Iqbal belong to the second category. It is obvious that the thinking and feelings of Iqbal were moulded and motivated by the social environments in which he opened his eyes. Had the Muslim society been free of the problems it faced, the content and tone of Iqbal's poetry as well as philosophy would have been quite different.

It is quite clear that Igbal had not theorised on social problems. He had not directly said anything about this concept itself and the term "social problems" occurs nowhere in his prose or poetical writings. But it does not mean that he was oblivious of the multifarious social problems that infected the Muslim society of his time. Iqbal was not a visionary. He had set before himself a goal, an ideal which permeates all his writings. This ideal was a balanced healthy life, a life not only of thought and reflection, but of practical participation in social activity. That is why that, in spite of being a celebrated poet and philosopher, he became a member and an office-bearer of a political party. He contested elections. It was he who persuaded the Qa'id-i A'zam Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, to return to India to lead the Muslims in the struggle ahead which he foresaw. He put forward political solutions to social problems. In 1930, in the course of his famous address at Allahabad, he clearly advocated the idea of a separate homeland for Muslims in India. Some people might wonder at a philosopher and a poet doing all this. But Iqbal's behaviour becomes quite plain when we realise that his aim was not an abstract knowledge of reality and the expression of impracticable transitory moods, but his ideal was a balanced healthy life which is possible only in a healthy society. In other words, he was a social reformer though he never called himself as such.

Iqbal's concept of an ideal Muslim society is derived from the Holy Qur'an, as he has himself said in a verse:

[If you want to live like a Muslim, it is not possible without the Holy Qur'an.]

The concrete and practical demonstration of the concept of an ideal individual life and of Muslim society is to be found in the pattern which was set for us by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) through his personal example and the society which he personally organised, supervised and guided. Maulana Salahuddin Ahmad has rightly pointed out in his book Sarir-i Khamah (Volume I), that "according to Iqbal the touchstone to find out the impurities in social life is provided to us by the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah."

It is in the light of this concept of an ideal Muslim society that we can understand and appreciate Iqbal's thinking on social problems.

After this introductory discussion let us now take up, one by one the social problems on which Iqbal has expressed himself either in verse or prose.

(I) Sectarianism and Parochialism. One of the foremost social problems which from the very beginning attracted Iqbal's attention was sectarianism. It was the major factor in the downfall of Muslim States and the disintegration of Muslim society everywhere. Iqbal was aware of the dangers inherent in sectarianism and, therefore, warned Muslims against them in a number of verses, e.g.:

[Do not use your tongue for sectarianism, there are terrible dangers hidden in it.

Sectarianism is a tree and prejudice is its fruit, one which causes the expulsion of Adam from heaven.

Addressing the moon in his poem "Hilal-e-Id" he says:

[Muslims are bound in the shackles of sectarianism, just see your freedom and their bondage.]

In the eighth canto of the poem "Mehrab Gul Afghan Ke Afkar" Iqbal condemns sectarianism, parochialism and tribalism:

that the tribal discrimination leads to humiliation.

Islamic society in the mountainous regions is broken up into small factions as each tribe worships its own idol of tribalism.]

<sup>&</sup>quot;Sayvid ki Lauh-i Turbat,' Bang-i Dara, p. 42 .

<sup>&</sup>quot;Taswir-i Dard," ibid., p.70.

Ibid., p. 200. \*

Darb-i-Kalim, p. 180.

(2) Onthodoxy. Orthodoxy and narrow conservatism was another social problem which stunted the growth of Muslim society. In a number of poems Iqbal has taken note of this problem. Often he satirises the Mulla who is an embodiment of orthodoxy, conservatism and narrow-mindedness, as, for example, the poem "Mulla Aur Bahisht" in Bal-i Jibril and poems entitled "Ijtihad," "Mulla-i Haram" and "Tauhid" included in Darb-i Kalim are all subtle satires against the "dry-as-dust" approach to Islam of the Mulla. Iqbal had these people in mind when he wrote:

[The most difficult stage in the life of nations is the fear of the new order and sticking to the old ways of behaviour.]

(3) Liberalism. From what has been said in the preceding paragraph it will be wrong to conclude that Iqbal was a liberalist or that he wanted to throw overboard all the old values which have been transmitted to us through the true 'Ulama' of Islam. In fact, he considered liberalism as a social problem that appeared in the Indian Muslim society as a fashion imported from the West. He considered it even more dangerous than orthodoxy and conservatism. This is perhaps the only problem which has been directly discussed at length in the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. In the sixth lecture entitled "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam," Iqbal writes:

"We heartily welcome the liberal movement in modern Islam; but it must also be admitted that the appearance of liberal

<sup>5.</sup> Bang-i-Dara, p, 191

ideas in Islam constitutes also the most critical moment in the history of Islam. Liberalism has a tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and the race-idea which appears to be working in modern Islam with greater force than ever may ultimately wipe off the broad human outlook which Muslim people have imbibed from this religion."6

In his poetical works also Iqbal has taken cognizance of this social phenomenon. He terms liberality of thought as an "invention of satan" He warns that liberalism of thought is dangerous for those who have no originality. He has written a poem entitled "Azadi-i Fikr" in which he says:

[Liberalism of thought brings destruction to those who do not possess originality of thought.

It is a way to turn men into beasts if it is immature.

(4) Modernism. This leads us to the consideration of an allied social problem, viz. modernism, which Iqbal disapproves in a number of his verses. According to him, modernism and blind imitation of the West have robbed us of the moral values which were our distinctive feature as Muslims. He writes:

Reconstruction, pp. 162-63.

<sup>7.</sup> Darb-i-Kalim, p. 74.

[Modern living has brought with itself strange consequences. It has brought jealousy, abject submission, impatience and lust.]

He ridicules the modernist tendency in the following humorous verse:

(Throw out into the street

the eggs of modern civilisation as they are bad and rotten.]

Iqbal believes that Muslims will lose their identity and individuality in blindly following the Western ways. People who show so much enthusiasm and raise the slogan of modernism are actually using this device as a cover for their apish mentality.

[Do not render useless your ego; you must guard it as it is a unique jewel. I am afraid this cry for modernism is a pretext for blindly following the West.]

(5) Adoption of Western Culture. Iqbal's concern was to

<sup>8.</sup> Bang-i-Dara, p. 252.

<sup>9.</sup> Ibid., p. 335.

<sup>10.</sup> Darb-i-Kalim, p. 170.

save Indian Muslims and Muslims living in other Eastern countries from the onslaught of the Western culture. Common people did not realise that Western civilisation was on the decline and that it was unwise to welcome it in the East and be subjugated by it:

[How can the Western culture revive Iran and the Arab countries; it is itself at the verge of its end.]

In his poems "Maghrabi Tahdhib" and "Mard-i Afrang," both included in *Darb-i Kalim*, he terms Western culture as a perversion of feeling and thought. For example, he says:

[Western civilisation is a perversion of the feeling and thought, the soul of this culture could not remain chaste.]

Iqbal wanted Muslims to preserve their own cultural heritage, and not to suffer from any sense of inferiority on that account:

<sup>11.</sup> Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>12.</sup> Ibid, p. 69.

## کیا تھے کو نمیں اپی خودی تک مجمی رسائی

[Even heavens may be illuminated by the fresh morning light emanating from within you,] only if you develop your independent point of view....

You are borrowing thoughts and ideas from the aliens.

You seem to have no access to your own individual self.]

In the whole poem "Iblis Ka Farman Apne Siyasi Farzandon Ke Nam" in *Darb-i Kalim*, <sup>14</sup> Iqbal's diagnosis of the downfall of Muslims is cultural subjugation to the West, and above all the fact that they have been robbed of the "Muhammadan Spirit"

(6) Slavery and Servile Mentality. In Iqbal's view slavery and the resultant slavish and servile mentality among the Muslims was highly deplorable and the root cause of many other social problems. A large number of verses contain references to this social malady. In fact the number of poems and verses written by Iqbal on this topic and a couple of other topics far exceeds the number of poems and verses written on any other single topic. Why does he not champion the cause of freedom of the Human Ego? Freedom of Human Ego is not just a philosophical theory for him. This was also his politicaland social creed. He had closely observed the devastating effects of the British imperialistic rule in India. He was particularly dismayed at the deep-rooted and incorrigible servile and slavish mentality that had crept into the minds of Indian Muslims. People at large were devoid of moral courage and self-confidence. They had lost the initiative and zest which are to be found among people of free nations. Furthermore, it led to isolationism, individualism and selfishness and a sense of inferiority. How beautifully has Iqbal described, in the following verse, the difference caused in human life

<sup>13.</sup> Ibid., pp. 120-21.

<sup>14.</sup> Ibid., p. 148.

by slavery on the one hand and freedom on the other:

[A shallow rivulet is further narrowed down by bondage, and life in freedom is like a limitless ocean.]

Iqbal has written a long Persian poem entitled "Bandgi Namah" (On Slavery), wherein he has painted a grim picture of the state of bondage and slavery. He has effectively depicted the harm it causes to an individual and to society as a whole:

[In slavery the heart dies within the body,

and spirit becomes a burden upon the body.

On account of slavery society is disintegrated into individuals

and everybody is at war with everybody else.]

In his poem "Mashriq-o-Maghrib" in *Darb-i Kalim*, he diagnoses the cause of the ills, prevalent in the Eastern countries, as slavery and imitation of the ways of the Western countries.

Iqbal's lengthy poem "Dar Bayan - i -Funun - i - Latifah - i - Ghulaman" (On the Fine Arts of the Slaves) brings out the truth that fine arts of the slave nations are decadent, pessimistic, retrogressive and negativistic. For example, he says:

<sup>15.</sup> Bang-i-Dara, p. 293.

<sup>16.</sup> Zabur-i 'Ajam, pp. 248-49

[How difficult I find it to describe the evil caused by slavery?

The fine arts of the slaves contain in them deaths.

The music of the slaves is devoid of the fire of life,
and it demolishes the wall of life just like flood-water.]

He further says in the same poem:

[Slavery saps life from the body.

What hope of any good can you have from a lifeless body?

Heart is robbed of inventiveness and initiative,

man becomes oblivious of himself.]

Similarly, in the poem "Madhhab-i Ghulaman" (Religion of the Slaves), he declares that the religion practised by the slave nations is devoid of real faith. Prayer is a routine affair, mechanically repeated. They pay mere lip service to the centre of their devotion and worship. The worship of the mighty and the powerful becomes

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<sup>17.</sup> Ibid, p. 251.

<sup>18.</sup> Ibid., p.257 .

their creed:

در غلای عشق و ندهب را فراق النمین ندگانی بدخات دین و دانش را غلام ارزال دید آبدن را زنده دارد جال دید آبدن را زنده دارد جال دید آبد بر لب پائے او نام خداست قبلہ او طاقت فرال رواست از غلاے ذوق دیدارے ججوے از غلاے دوق دیدارے ججوے از غلاے جون بیدارے ججوے

[In slavery there occurs a duality between love, i.e, inner experience and religion,

the syrup of life turns bitter ....

A slave is ready to sell off both his faith and intelligence at a cheap price.

 He is ready to give up even his spiritual self in order to keep the body alive.

Although he utters the name of God, yet in reality he pays homage to the might of the ruler....

Do not expect the slave to possess the taste for communion with God, and do not expect him to have a spirit awake to higher experiences.]

On the contrary, Iqbal praises the "Arts of the Free People'. These are life-giving and inspire confidence in us. He invites the reader to closely observe and ponder over the creative activity of the free people. In such a case, according to Iqbal, the reader will himself discover in these arts characteristics quite different from those of the slave nations. These arts do not effeminate the observer. They infuse in the observer the masculine qualities:

کی زبال با رفتگال صحبت گزیں
صنعت آزاد مردال ہم بہ بیں
سنگها باشکها پیوستہ اند
روزگارے را بہ آنے بستہ اند
دیدن او پخت تر ساز د ترا
دیدن او پخت تر ساز د ترا
فقش سوئے نقش کر می آورو
اند ضمیر او خبر می آورو
محت مردانہ و طبع بلند
در دل سنگ ایں دو طبع بلند

[For a while take yourself to the company of the distinguished ancestors, you will have a glimpse of the arts and crafts of the free people....

How gracefully they have fitted stone with stone;

They have created lime with moments.

The sight of these pieces of art inspire you with strength and take you to a different realm.

A look at the artistic creation points to the Creator and gives you an idea of the Creator's mind.

Courage and dignity are the two high traits, which have been imprinted in stone.

A strange and lamentable manifestation of servile mentality among Muslims was the tendency in quite a large section of the so-called 'ulama' to interpret the Qur'an to suit the wishes of the alien rulers. According to Iqbal, it was highly abominable:

[The Holy Qur'an which teaches a Mu'min to be sovereign even to the planets

has been interpreted to contain teachings for the renunciation of the world....

Slavery corrupts the mentality of nations to such an extent that whatever was originally right has now been declared as wrong.]

Iqbal uses very strong language in condemning this opportunism in his poem entitled "ljtihad":

[These slaves are of the view that the Holy Book is deficient as it does not teach a Mu'min the manners of slavery.]

At another place he deplores opportunism in these words:

[Under the pretext of interpreting the religious issues they prepare the slaves to be reconciled to slavery.]

Slavish and servile mentality was also observable among

<sup>21.</sup> Darb-i-Kalim, p. 8.

<sup>22.</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>23.</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

artists, i.e. the painters and the poets. Iqbal was equally vehement in expressing his disapproval in their case. He wanted them to show originality in their artistic creations and not to imitate the style of the Westerners. For example, he says:

[Originality of imagination has died away to such an extent that the Eastern people, Indians and Iranians both, have turned into blind imitators of the Westerners.]

In another poem he writes thus:

[Non-Arab style is not good for a nation whose ego has been softened under the influence of slavery.]

Iqbal's spirit revolted against this state of affairs. In fact, he was ashamed of being born in an enslaved country where people had no urge for freedom:

<sup>24.</sup> Ibid., p. 123.

<sup>25.</sup> Ibid., p. 126.

[O God! You caused me to take birth in a country where people are reconciled to slavery.]

Iqbal was deeply concerned over the ideological confusion prevalent among Muslims, which came as a result of a long period of slavery:

[Think of some remedy for their ideological confusion, two hundred years of slavery has broken their spirit.]

The ultimate result of this servile attitude was the loss of identity:

[When literature and religion of a nation both lose the originality and egohood,

it leads to the humiliation of the nation ]

<sup>26.</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>27.</sup> Ibid., p. 55 .

<sup>28.</sup> Ibid., p. 98.

[Due to the death of egohood among the Eastern nations no genius discoverer of Divine secrets was born.]

All this is due to the ravages of imperialism which has its own baits and temptations to entrap the weak nations:

[There remains no obstacle in the way of imperialism as the slaves become confirmed in the habit of slavery.]

(7) Western Education. One of the necessary evils and somehow it became a social problem which come in the wake of foreign rule, was what came to be called Western education, that is, the system of education enforced by the British rulers in India. It would be wrong to assume that Iqbal was opposed to any modification, in the age-old educational system prevalent among Indian Muslims. However, he foresaw the social effects of Western education, specially its effects on the mediocre minds and society is composed mainly of mediocre minds. Western educational system in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was notoriously devised by Lord Macaulay to achieve certain imperialistic objectives which were good according to the moral code of the rulers. Fortunately for the rulers and unfortunately for the Indian Muslims, quite a large percentage

<sup>29.</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>30.</sup> Ibid., p. 145.

of students who received education under this system acquired atheistic tendencies and a contempt for Eastern and Islamic culture. Quite a few Muslim leaders had sincerely and in good faith supported the Western educational system as they hoped that Muslims would obtain certain economic benefits by it. But, in exchange of whatever economic benefits accrued, Muslim society had to pay a heavy price in the form of the loss of certain values. Iqbal expresses these views in a poem "Ta'lim Aur Us Ke Nata'ij" (Education and Its Consequences):

[We believed that education, i.e- Western educational system, would bring prosperity;

little did we know that it would entail atheism.]

Iqbal, no doubt, conceded that education imparted under an alien system did enable the Muslim young men to earn their living but they were, more often than not, robbed of their faith. These views are contained in a poem entitled "Firdaus Men Ek Mukalamah" (A Dialogue in Paradise):

<sup>31.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 233.

<sup>32.</sup> lbid., p. 276.

[When the heavens turned over the leaf of days, a voice was heard saying: \*O, you will get worldly honour through education;

but as a result of this an upheaval has taken place in the beliefs: in other words, you have gained the world, but the bird of faith has flown away.]

In another poem he further explains his viewpoint on this issue:

[Modern age is like the angel of death, which has taken away from you your soul by giving you the worry for earning a livelihood....

Those secrets which had been concealed from your sight by the school can be discovered by meditation on mountains and in wilderness.]

Female education, otherwise so essential, was also yielding undesirable results. Iqbal has pointed but this serious social problem through humour in *Bang-i Dara*:

[Girls are learning English.

The nation has thus discovered the way to its salvation.

People now aim at Western fashions

and consider the Eastern culture as sinful.

All eyes are now watching for the raising of the curtain;

Let us now see what scene of this drama appears on the stage.

[A knowledge which takes away feminine qualities from women is considered fatal by the men of insight.

Sciences and arts taught in female educational institutions,

where there are no arrangements for religious instructions, are ruinous for inner life of real love.

Iqbal considered the so-called liberal education imparted under the Western educational system as an intrigue against the Muslims. He has pointed out this fact in a poem entitled "Din-o Ta'lim" (Faith and Education):

<sup>34.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 325.

<sup>35.</sup> Darb-i Kalim, p. 95.

[This system of education devised by alien Christian missionaries is an intrigue against faith and morality.]

According to Iqbal, the Western educational system has not only robbed Muslims of faith and morality but has also deprived them of certain social values which were the peculiarity of the Muslim East. For example, the teacher was always held in the highest esteem among the Muslims. But since the Western educational system has infused into the minds of students a materialistic and commercial outlook, the age-old sacred teacher-student relationship has deteriorated into a shopkeeper-customer relationship:

[There were times when students were ready to offer even their hearts, i.e. the most cherished possessions, in return to the service of the teacher.


But now times have changed to such an extent that after the lesson is over.

the student ask his teacher to present his bill for payment.]

<sup>36.</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>37.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 327

Iqbal was aware of the fact that the Western educational system was an unavoidable and necessary evil. Muslims could either accept it as such or have it go without it altogether; the latter course being even deadlier for the future of Muslim society. So in this predicament the question that arose in Iqbal's mind was whether there was any remedy against the ill effects of this system. Yes, there was one—strong faith. Only strong faith could shield the Muslim youth against the devastating ill effects of the alien educational system. In his poem "Javid Sc" (To Javid) he says:



[Even if one studies under the Western educational system, there is no risk of any harm, provided faith in one God is imbedded in the very nature of a man.]

(8) Alienation from Islam and Weakening of Faith. Gradual alienation from the teachings of Islam and weakening of faith was a chronic social problem in the Muslim society, particularly in India. This phenomenon can be traced back to the period ensuing the Khilafat-i Rashidah. This tendency continued to grow imperceptibly during the centuries in various Muslim lands. But in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent the process started notably in Akbar's reign. Proclamation by Akbar of the so-called Din-i Ilahi, a hotchpotch of elements borrowed from Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, to win for himself the allegiance of the greatest number, was the beginning of the drift away from the purity of Islam. The problem became quite serious during the British rule. One of the avowed but unpublicised objectives of the educational

system introduced by the Britishers was that when Muslim young men completed education in the recognised schools and colleges, they might not become Christians, but they would not remain Muslims either. This system was showing wonderful results for the rulers. It soon became a fashion with a great majority of Muslim students completing their education in the colleges to doubt and sometimes even to challenge the fundamentals of Islam. Iqbal took note of this social problem quite early in his poetic career. Poems and verses lamenting this state of affairs are to be found in all his collections, which shows that he remained concerned about this issue throughout his lifetime:

[(O moon), look! in the mosque the binding string of the rosary of the priest has broken;

but on the contrary in the temple the Hindu priest's faith has been strengthened.

Also observe non-Muslims practising principles of Islam and Muslims torturing their fellow Muslims.]

In the long poem entitled "Jawab-i Shikwah" Iqbal has ascribed the downfall of the Muslims to atheism, disregard of the Qur'an, non-observance of the duties and of the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet as also to a number of other social evils:

40

[Hands are weakened and the hearts have become accustomed to atheism.

The followers bring bad name to the Prophet, i.e. by the violation of the principles laid down by him.]

کون ہے آرک آئین رسول مخار<sup>اء</sup> مصلحت وقت کی ہے کس کے عمل کا معیار کس کی آگھوں میں علیا ہے شعار اغیار ہوگئ کس کی نگھ طرز سلف سے بے زار قلب میں سوز نہیں' روح میں اصاس نہیں آگھ بھی پیغام مجھ کا خہیں پاس نہیں

[Who has renounced the ways laid down by the Holy Prophet?]
Who has made opportunism the criterion for his actions?]
Who has developed a liking for the ways of the non-Muslims?
Who has started disliking the manners of his ancestors? (The implied answer is, Muslims)

Hearts are devoid of warmth and souls are devoid of feelings, You have no regard for the message of the Holy Prophet.]

واعظ قوم کی وہ پختہ خیالی نہ رہی

)

<sup>40.</sup> Ibid., p. 222.

<sup>41.</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

[The priest lacks in the strength of convictions,

there is no force in his nature, nor is there any warmth in his sermon.

the adhan has turned into a ritual, devoid of the Bilalian spirit;

there is only philosophising left while Ghazali's counsel has gone.

Mosques lament the decreasing number of the people coming to

offer prayers:

in short, pure Islamic traits have vanished from the character of Muslims.]

[Everyone among you Muslims is dead drunk with the wine of lethargy, Are you really Muslims? Is this the way the Muslims ought to conduct themselves?

You lack the faqr of Hadrat 'Ali and the wealth of Hadrat 'Uthman.

You have no spiritual connection with your ancestors.

They were respected in the world for being (true) Muslims, whereas you are looked down upon for renouncing the Holy Qur'an.]

Sometimes Iqbal finds the state of affairs so desperate that

<sup>42.</sup> Ibid., p. 225


<sup>43.</sup> Ibid., p. 227

he cries out:

[The rows of Muslims are curved; their hearts are confused and their prayers are spiritless.

All this is because there is no internal warmth and religious fervour left in them.]

Iqbal finds this tendency to ignore the true teachings of Islam present in every field of life. He says:



[In culture, in mysticism, in Shari'ah and in dialectic philosophy there is imitation of non-Arab alien traditions.

The reality of religion has been lost in absurdities and this Ummah has become entrapped in unwanted traditions....]

How sad it is that the fire of Divine love is extinguished and Muslims have become just a heap of ashes.]

At a stage alienation from Islam took the form of

<sup>44.</sup> Bat-i-Jibrit, p.120.

<sup>45.</sup> Ibid., pp. 167-68.

secularism adopted as a political and social creed in the West. It came as a fashion to Muslim countries, but it was fraught with dangers for them. Iqbal warned them of a number of social problems created by secularism, particularly in the political field in a poem entitled "La-din Siyasat" (Secular Politics). Iqbal's advice to Muslims is:

[O Muslim! keep your ties with the Islamic millat intact.

You should remain attached to the tree—of your milat—and hope that some day there again will be spring for the tree—and it will bear fruit.]

(9) Nationalism. The first half of the 20th century saw nationalism becoming the most popular political creed. It spread from Western countries to various lands in the East. Muslim countries fighting for independence from foreign rule found nationalism the most effective weapon in their struggle against imperialism. However, beyond a certain limit it clashes with the international and universal spirit of Islam. Nationalism is recommended by Iqbal only as a transitory measure and strategy. He writes:

"For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics.... It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions

for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members."47

How prophetic these words have proved now when we see the Muslim world moving in the direction indicated by Iqbal! But at the time when Iqbal was writing these lines, nationalism was considered by far the only sensible political ideal to be pursued. But from the broader point of view of Islam it has a tendency to divide whereas Islam aims at unifying at least the Muslim world. That is why Iqbal was opposed to nationalistic outlook. It created social problems one way or the other in the Muslim countries. In Muslim India it culminated into a religio-political thinking which saw in a united India, rather than in Pakistan, the solution of the problems facing Muslims. The root cause of nationalism is attachment to homeland which Iqbal decried in the following verses in the poem named "Wataniyat" (Theory of Attachment to Homeland):

ان آزہ خداوُں میں بڑا سب سے وطن ہے
جو پیربُن اس کا ہے وہ ندہب کا کفن ہے
ہی بہت کہ تراشیدہ تندیب نوی ہے
غارت گر کاشانہ دین نبوی ہے
ہو قید مقامی تو نتیجہ ہے جابی
رہ بحر میں آزاد وطن صورت مابی
اتوام جمال میں ہے رقابت تو ای سے
تنخیر ہے مقصود تجارت تو ای سے
ع

[Among the new gods the greatest is the "motherland".

<sup>47.</sup> Reconstruction, p. 159.

<sup>48.</sup> Bang-i-Dara, pp. 173-74.

Its dress is the shroud for religion.

This idol which has been shaped by the modern civilisation has a tendency to disintegrate the Islamic family created by the Holy Prophet....

The result of the narrow local loyalties is nothing but ruin.

You should be free of local and territorial attachments just like
a fish which moves freely in the ocean....

Rivalries among nations of the world is due to nationalism, and also it is due to it that some nations secretly aim at the subjugation of other nations under the cover of trade.]

Then Iqbal tries to correct the mistaken thinking regarding nationalism by declaring it as a disintegrating force while the cementing force is Islam:

[Nation is in reality based on religion; without it a nation is nothing. If there is no mutual gravitational force working in the stars, they cannot be bound into a system.]

He further says in Zabur-i 'Ajam:

50

<sup>49.</sup> Ibid., p. 223

Zabur-i 'Ajam, p. 117.

51

[This point exposes the hidden secret that a country is just like a body, while faith\_religion\_is like its soul.]

According to Iqbal, the dichotomy between State and religion is the creation of the wrong notion once prevalent among the Western people that body and mind were two separate entities:

[Since the Westerners considered body separate from mind, hence they believe State and religion to be different from each other.]

(10) Capitalism and Feudalism. Islam is anti-capitalist and antifeudalist in spirit. It discourages the exploitation of the downtrodden. The life of the Holy Prophet shows how much regard he had for the labourer. On many an occasion, we are told, the Holy Prophet worked with ordinary labourers. It was he who said: "Pay the wages of the labourer before the sweat on his forehead dries up." Unfortunately the capitalist order somehow became firmly established in most of the Muslim countries. Iqbal found Muslim States adopting or having had already adopted capitalistic and feudalistic economic system. Conscious of the ills accompanying capitalism, Iqbal expressed his disapproval for adopting it:

<sup>51.</sup> Ibid. ("Gulshan-i Raz Jadid"), p. 217.

<sup>52.</sup> Armughan-i Hijaz (Kulliyat-i Iqbal Farisi), p. 654.

[I know that this *Ummah* has ceased to uphold the teachings of the Holy Qur'an,

even a Mu'min has faith in capitalism.

I know that in this dark night in the East

the Muslim priests do not possess the shining hand, i e. inner light.]

At the time when Iqbal was writing his poetry, the country, specially Muslim majority areas, were not industrialised. Therefore capitalism existed in the form of feudalism. Feudal lords exploited the poor peasants. Iqbal condemns feudalism in the most forceful words:

[Burn every ear of wheat of the farm,

from which a farmer does not get his subsistence.]

[The foudal lord


bas sucked the blood of his poor tenant.]

Iqbal has taken note of the social problems attendant on capitalism, feudalism and exploitation of the poor, in a number of poems. For example, he pleads for social change in the poems

<sup>53.</sup> Bal-i-Jibril, p. 149.

<sup>54.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 333.

"Punjab Ke Dehqan Se"55 (To he Peasant of the Punjab) and "Punjab Ke Pirzadon Se"56 (To the Pirzadahs of the Punjab) and in the poem "Punjabi Musulman"57 he has exhorted the Punjabi Muslims, mainly farmers and workers, to wake up and change the existing unjust social order. He asks them to break the shackles of the feudalistic system. Not only that, he appeals to Muslims to get rid of the old customs which are remnants of capitalistic-feudalistic social set-up:



Break the idols of tribalism and shatter the chains of old customs.

Iqbal's opposition to capitalism and feudalism was traceable to his firm faith in the just social and economic order based on the teachings of the Holy Qur'an. The basic postulate of the Islamic economic order, derived from the Holy Qur'an, is contained in the following verse of Iqbal:

[God commands that "There is nothing for a man except that for

<sup>55.</sup> Bal-i Jibril, p. 204.

<sup>56.</sup> Ibid., pp. 211-12.

<sup>57.</sup> Darb-i Kalim, p. 58.

<sup>58.</sup> Bal-i Jibril, p. 204

<sup>59.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 335 .

which he has striven."

Therefore why should a capitalist eat the fruit of the hard work of a labourer ?

(11) Communism and Socialism. Iqbal took note, both in prose and verse, of what in future was going to become a social problem and was to create some other problems in the Muslim world, i.e. communism and socialism. In the lecture entitled "Is Religion Possible?" he writes thus:

"Both nationalism and atheistic socialism, at least in the present state of human adjustments, must draw upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion, and resentment which tend to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy. Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor nationalism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity."60

Iqbal was closely watching the impact of the experiment of atheistic socialism being carried out in Russia. Large Muslim areas in Central Asia had already been inundated by the onrushing flood of that ideology. It did not only change the economic order, which it originally promised to do—and had it done only that it might have been welcome there—but it went much beyond the promised limits: It changed the very social structure, which, ipso facto, involved a major change in the religious and moral code.

The study of Iqbal's poems like "Lenin Khuda Ke Hudur Men," Ishtirakiyat, "62" "Karl Marx Ki Awaz, "63" and "Bolshevik


<sup>60.</sup> Reconstruction, pp. 188-89.

<sup>61.</sup> Bal-i-Jibril, pp. 144-47.

<sup>62.</sup> Darb-i Kalim, p. 138.

<sup>63.</sup> Ibid., p. 139.

Roos", 64 do indicate the poet's admiration for certain good points in socialism and communism which resembled certain teachings of Islam. From these poems we further learn about Iqbal's judgment that the economic ideals of socialism were better than those of capitalism. However, Iqbal stresses the point that the ideology and economic programme given by Islam was the best and, therefore, sufficient for Muslims:



[O Muslim! you should dive into the Holy Qur'an, may God bless you with originality of action.]

(12) Persecution of Muslims by Non-Muslims. A social problem which greatly influenced Muslim society was their persecution at the hands of non-Muslims. In the case of Hindus the chief form of persecution was untouchability. Hindus treated Muslims as impure and contemptible. Iqbal, in the beginning of his career as a poet and philosopher, took for granted the Indian nationhood for Muslims and worked for it. But the daily demonstration of the ingrained and incorrigible hostile attitude of the Hindus for Muslims and their culture, their murderous attacks on Muslims, arsen and looting of Muslim property by them and disputes over the cow-slaughter, forced Iqbal, as later on it was to force the Qa'id-i A'zam also, to change his views on Hindu-Muslim harmony and co-existence. He found the solution of this social problem in a separate homeland for Muslims in the Indo-Pak subcontinent.

<sup>64.</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>65.</sup> Ibid., p. 138.

Muslims were not persecuted by Hindus alone. The British rulers also had a grudge against them and, therefore, discriminated against them in services and in economic opportunities. It appears there was an implicit understanding between the alien rulers and Hindu leaders. They joined hands in humiliating and harming the Muslims. This conspiracy has now clearly been exposed after the confessions of Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy in India, about his nasty role at the time of the creation of Pakistan. Iqbal's prophetic vision had foreseen the conspiracy long ago. He expressed his concern at the persecution of Muslims at the hands of the non-Muslims in the following verses:

[The Brahmins call the Muslims as traitors, whereas the Englishmen treat them as mere beggars.


The code of the new prophet sprung in the Punjab (i.e. Ahmadism) describes the orthodox Muslims as infidels.]

(13) Ahmadism. Ahmadism, founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, started as a reformative movement but as time passed it broke away from Islam to become a separate religious community in the lifetime of its founder. The movement soon developed into the most painful social problem for the Muslim society in India, since, in reality, according to the unanimous verdict of the 'ulama' of all sects of Islam, Ahmadism did not qualify to be included in the fold of Islam, but its exponents insisted on calling

themselves Muslims and labelling Muslims as non-Muslims. Severe controversies raged round religious issues which were settled and regarding which there was no difference of opinion. In some cases families were divided on account of conversion of one or more members to the new faith. If only either husband or wife was converted to Ahmadism the problem became all the more complicated and painful. The founder of the community had ordained that an Ahmadi girl cannot be married to a non-Ahmadi boy. However, non-Ahmadi girls were acceptable in marriage in Ahmadi families. Tension also arose on the founder's verdict that unflinching allegiance to the British rulers was a religious duty and that Jihad, always considered as a religious duty in view of clear verses in the Qur'an, had become prohibited or haram on the appearance of the "new prophet" in the person of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani himself. All these pronouncements ran counter to the accepted beliefs of the Muslims of all shades of opinion.

Iqbal realised the dangerous implications of the newly founded faith. It was mainly with this background that he discussed, at length, and offered a philosophical proof of universally accepted Islamic concept of the finality of Prophethood, in one of the lectures included in *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.

Iqbal also criticised the views of the founder of Ahmadism regarding the institution of *Jihad*. Referring indirectly, but, clearly to the views of Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani, Iqbal wrote:



[Much has been written on the cancellation of *Jihad*, now let him write a tract on the denial of *Hajj*.]

In a poem entitled "Jihad," Igbal says:

[The Shaikh,i.e. Mirza Gbulam Ahmad Qadiani, has given the verdict that this is the age of the pen,

and that now sword has become ineffective in the world....

Europe bas been fully armed from top to toe

for the protection of the greatness of the forces of evil.

We ask the old man supporting the Christian doctrines

if war is evil only in the East, must it not be evil in the West too?

If he really says what is true, is it right on his part that

he should criticise Islam but ignore the wrong doings of Europe?]

Iqbal knew that these teachings were intended to discourage Muslims all over the world fighting for their independence. In plain words, these teachings aimed at persuading the Muslims to acquiesce in the state of bondage.

The bond of Islam brings about unity among Muslims of various eastes and racial groups. But the new faith weakened the unity of the Muslim society and Iqbal considered it highly object.lonable.

The Millat is alive only on account of the unity of thought.

A revelation-here the reference is to the claims of Mirza Ghulam

Ahmad\_which destroys unity, is atheistic.

You better invent a faith in which mysticism

brings meckness, servitude, and eternal pessimism.]

In another poem entitled "Imamat" (Religious Leadership) Iqbal says:

The religious leadership of a monochio persuades Muslims to pay allegiance to kings, is catastrophic for the Islamic Millat.

Here, again, the reference is to the views preached by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that those Muslims who were not loyal to the British rulers were violating a religious injunction.

<sup>69.</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>70.</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

Iqbal has delineated upon the social perils involved in the claim to prophethood for himself by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in the poem "Ilham-o Azadi" wherein he writes:

May God save us from the revelation of a slave; it is as ruinous for nations as the ravages of Chingiz.

Similarly, in another poem captioned "Nabuwwat" (Prophet-hood) he writes:

[A prophethood which does not deliver the message of strength and glory is like the leaves of hashish which opiate.]

We find verses on this social issue in a number of other poems e.g. "Mahdi," "Punjabi Musalman," "Azadi," "Azadi," "Etc., which shows how deeply Iqbal was concerned over the social problems created by Ahmadism.

(14) Pessimism and Negativism. The cumulative result of all the social problems which afflicted Muslim society, specially in the

<sup>71.</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>72.</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

<sup>73.</sup> Ibid., p. 56 •

<sup>74.</sup> Ibid., p. 58 •

<sup>75.</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

subcontinent, was a deep sense of frustration and pessimism. Our poetry and literature mirrored this mood or else it induced an escape from the painful situation through fairy tales. The tragedy was that our artists as well as the so-called Messiahs accentuated this mood. Thus pessimism and negativism became social problems.

Iqbal condemned this attitude in artists when he wrote:

[Their thinking serves a death-blow to true love and ecstasy; in their dark ideas are hidden the tombs of nations.]

We find verses on the same theme in Iqbal's other poems, e.g. "Shi'r-i" 'Ajam," "Sha'ir," "Surud-i Haram," 9 etc. In "Surud-i Haram," he Writes:

[If they contain in their tunes the message of death, then, in my eyes, the flute, the lute and *rubab* are *haram*.]

Similarly, in the poem captioned "Funun-i Latifah" (Fine Arts) he says:

<sup>76.</sup> Ibid., p. 128.77. Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>78.</sup> Ibid., p. 126 •

<sup>79.</sup> Ibid., p. 125.

<sup>80.</sup> Ibid.

[Whether it is the poems written by a poet, or songs sung by a singer, if they sadden the garden, i.e. society, they are no morning breeze.]

Iqbal exhorts Muslims not to lose hope and confidence. They should be optimistic and continue their struggle. He wants them to have faith in their energies:

[O you, who are oblivious of yourself, become conscious of your real nature,

you are a drop but you possess the depth of a fathomless ocean too.

Why are you shackled by the magic of a sense of being a nonentity?

Look, there is hidden in your own self the grandeur of a storm.]

Iqbal is not dismayed and discouraged at the temporary phase of trials and tribulations:

The temporary scene of gloom cannot frighten me,

<sup>81.</sup> Ibid, p. 117.

<sup>82.</sup> Bang-i Dara, p. 213.

<sup>83.</sup> Ibid., p. 217.

I have trust in the bright future of my Millat.]

My life is free from the element of pessimism, the fury of the battlefield foretells of the eventual victory.

The poem "Asiri" (Imprisonment) imparts a lesson to Muslims not to lose heart on account of slavery. It may rather be turned to an advantage. Look, the drop of rain, entrapped in the shell, becomes a pearl, and a drop of blood, enclosed in the pouch of a musk deer, becomes musk.

Iqbal's poem entitled "Tulu'-i Islam' (The Dawn of Islam) carries the message of hope and confidence for Muslims. For example, he says:

[The fierce storm blowing from the West has turned Muslims into staunch Muslims.

A pearl is nurtured by the storms in the ocean.

God is once again going to bestow upon the Mu'min

the Turkish glory, the Indian intellect and Arab eloquence.]

<sup>84.</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85.</sup> Ibid., p. 286.

<sup>86.</sup> Ibid., p. 304.

In the same poem he further says:

کتاب لمت بینا کی پھر شیرازہ بندی ہے 
$$^{87}$$
 بیدا  $^{87}$  بیدا  $^{87}$ 

[The scattered leaves of the book of the Muslim Millat are again going to be bound together in order.

This tree of the Hashimite Prophet-Muslim Millat-is again going to bear (ruit.]

(15) Iqbal's Solution of Social Problems. Iqbal's poetry and philosophy were like beacon of light in the dark night of despondency which engulfed Muslims in India and elsewhere. He himself said:

[The spark of my song is a candle for you.]

He did not just lament over the multifarious social, political and economic problems, that had spread a pall of gloom over the Muslim society. He also showed them a way out. Through his philosophy and poetry he pointed out to Muslims the direction in which they must move if they wanted to achieve their goal and made it abundantly clear that they must possess certain positive individual and national traits in order to get out of the sad predicament. It was clear that Iqbal desired them to be ready to play the role of leadership among the nations of the world, whenever the opportunity arose and Iqbal's seer-like vision foresaw this

<sup>87.</sup> Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>88.</sup> Bal-i Jabril, p. 93.


opportunity occurring in not very distant future.

[O Musilins I learn once again the lesson of Truthfulness, Justice and Bravery;

You are going to be entrusted with the leadership of the world.]

Iqbal wanted Muslims to acquire the traits of dignified poise, self-confidence, selflessness, initiative, strong convictions, freedom from the fear of death, simplicity, the habit of meditation, etc., because all these traits go to make a person a real Mu'min or Mujahid—Iqbal's ideal man.

Only a society composed of such men of character can be free of social problems and can ultimately qualify itself to play the leading role in the world.



[Only he overpowers the rotation of time who can create an eternal life in every breath.]

## EXTRA-SENSORY PERCEPTION (E. S. P.)

Extrasensory Perception (E.S.P.) is the perception of objects and events without the use of sense-organs. Some people have preferred to use the term "parapsychology" for it. It is quite a wide term as it includes telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, psychokinesis (P.K.), precognition of future events, psychical phenomena, etc. The belief in the existence of E.S.P. and allied phenomena in certain individuals of extraordinary powers has always been present among the followers of almost all religions. However, scientists have generally tended to treat the subject disdainfully, probably because, it is supposed, it does not fulfil one of the criteria of science, i.e. the possibility of repeatable experiments. They have, therefore, by and large, equated it with superstition and obscurantism. Such deep-rooted and strong prejudice of the scientists against parapsychology has been the cause of its neglect. Psychologists themselves have been rather reluctant in recognizing parapsychology as a genuine field of study.

In modern times the interest in extra-sensory perception or parapsychology may be traced back to the year 1882 when the well-known Society for Psychical Research was first formed in London. It was only in late thirties in the 20th century that psychologists relented and became somewhat open-minded on the subject. A laboratory for research in parapsychology was set up in the Duke University. By the year "1952, there were some indications of a slight trend towards acceptance of E.S.P. as a valid phenomenon". The best known work in this field is being carried on in a state-financed parapsychical laboratory in Leningrad in the U.S.S.R.

<sup>1.</sup> Floyed L. Ruch, Psychologrand Life.

This change of mind occurred in the wake of persistent reports of certain undeniable data. It will be profitable to have a glance at the data available in history, particularly Islamic history.

First of all, let us take examples from the life of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and some other illustrious persons from the history of Islam.

- (i) It is reported in the Sahih Muslim, "Kitab al-Fitn," that on the occasion of the Battle of the Trench, the Prophet clearly predicted to his Companions: "You will fight in the Arabian peninsula and God will give you victory. Then you will fight against Persia and you will be victorious, and then you will fight against Roma and you will win." Earlier on the same occasion the Prophet had told his Companions how he had had the vision of the cities of Persia, the Roman Empire and Abyssinia. The prediction came true.
- (ii) Once the Prophet visited the house of a poverty-stricken Companion, Hadrat Jabir, and asked if he had a carpet in his house. He replied in the negative and thought that the Prophet was just joking. But the Prophet said: "Yes, soon you will sit on carpets and costly floor coverings." This prediction also proved true.
- (iii) It is well known that the Prophet predicted the victories of Khaibar, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Kirman, Egypt, Jerusalem, Constantinople and Turkey. He predicted the death of Hadrat Zainab, one of this wives, Hadrat Fatima, his ughter, and also his own death. He correctly foretold that the duration of the period of the Caliphate after him would be thirty years. He clearly foresaw the chaotic conditions that would ensue the death of Hadrat 'Umar and also the martyrdom of the last three Caliphs. He forewarned people of the civil war between Hadrat 'Ali and Hadrat 'A'ishah Siddiqah; as also that between Hadrat 'Ali and Hadrat Amir Mu'awiya. The Prophet had the vision about the reconciliation of Hadrat Hasan and

- (iv) We have a well-known example of E.S.P. from the life of Hadrat 'Umar. He had sent to Syria, for jihad, an army under the command of Hadrat Sariyah. One day Hadrat 'Umar was delivering Friday sermon. During the course of the sermon he abruptly uttered these words:

  [Insert American Suriyah Sariyah] which is to the mountain which he was lecturing. When after a few days a messenger from the army came to the capital, he informed the caliph: "O Ruler of the Faithful! one day when the army was just at the verge of defeat a voice was heard thrice urging Sariyah to move to the mountain side. We obeyed and retreated to the mountain for protection. As a result, with God's grace, we inflicted a crushing defeat on the non-believers."
- (v) There is a story of a Punjabi majdlub recorded in the book entitled Hikayat-i Auliya' by Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanvi. This majdhub lived in a small village known as Lohari, where a renowned religious divine Hadrat Haji 'Abd al-Rahim Shahid also lived. The religious divine went for Hajj by ship. One day his water-pot fell into the sea. Soon a hand appeared from the sea with the water-pot and handed it back to Haji 'Abd al-Rahim. Exactly at that moment, back in Lohari, the majdhub was telling the personal attendant of Haji 'Abd al-Rahim: "The water-pot had fallen from the hand of your Haji [i.e. Haji 'Abd al-Rahim] into the sea. I have handed back his water-pot to him." When Haji 'Abd al-Rahim returned from Hajj he confirmed the account given by the majdhub. This is clearly a case of telepathy and psychokinesis.

- (vi) In the same book there is a story of another seer, named Hafiz 'Abd al-Qadir, who lived in Delhi in 1857. One day the reporter of the testimony was following him when he abruptly stopped and started crying: "Beware! beware! beware!" Then pointing to his chest he said: "I am hit by bullet here. I am hit by bullet here!" Hardly about five weeks had passed when the sad events of 1857 started and the seer was hit by a bullet in the chest exactly in the same way as he had prophesied, and he died.
- (vii) Instances from the life of Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thani may also be quoted in this regard. One day during a journey Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thani said to his companions: "When I turned my attention inwards I learnt that an unexpected calamity will befall us." He then told them to recite a certain prayer for protection against the calamity. Within hours of the prediction a fire broke out which could not be controlled, In the general chaos that ensued many lives were lost. But those who recited the prayer, taught by Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thani, escaped unharmed.<sup>2</sup>
- (viii) Once the younger brother of Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thani went to Qandhar on a business journey. In his absence Hadrat Mujaddid Alif Thani told the people: "It is a strange matter that whenever I turned my attention to know about the well-being of my brother, I could not find him anywhere on the surface of the earth, though I tried my level best to search him. When I further meditated I only saw his grave." Just a few days after it the companions of his younger brother returned from Qandhar and informed him that his younger brother had died there.<sup>3</sup>

Quite a large number of instances of E.S.P. are quoted from the life of Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani. I would suffice to reproduce

<sup>2.</sup> Muhammad Halim, Mujaddid A'zam (Lahore; Shu'a'-i Adab, 1958), p. 132.

<sup>3.</sup> Ibid., pp. 133-34.

just one.

(ix) One day in Muharram 559, Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani was sitting in his guest-room with about three hundred of his devotees. Abruptly he got up and hastily left the room beckoning the other people to follow him immediately. No sooner had they left the room when the roof fell with a crash. He told the people that when he was sitting he was forewarned about the collapse of the roof.<sup>4</sup>

A large number of examples of E.S.P. are also to be found in the book entitled Ibriz written in the year 1129 A.H. in Arabic by 'Allamah Ahmad b. Mubarak Salimasi of Algiers. The book is actually the biography of a saint Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz Dabbagh, It contains his miracles and the miracles of his spiritual guide and relative Sayyid Fashtali al-'Arabi. The book has been translated into Urdu by Dr Muhammad Hasan of Rawalpindi and is entitled Khazinat al-Ma'arif. In this book there is a story related by one Ahmad b. 'Abd Allah and it is reproduced here in his own words: "I was in Sabis. Al-'Arabi told me that a great mishap had occurred. I asked him about the nature of the mishap, whereupon he said: 'Muhammad b. Nasir has just expired.' I asked him as to how he had come to know about it. He replied: 'There is no doubt about his death.' When I expressed surprise he pointed to a man who was coming and said: 'Look at the man who is coming there. He is bringing the news of the death of Muhammad b. Nasir.' The man was still at a distance and was not clearly visible. We ourselves walked up to receive the man. When at last we met him we asked if there was any news. He said: 'Muhammad b, Nasir had died."5

Now we take an example of mediumship and contacting the souls of the dead. In Karachi there lived a lady who acted as a

<sup>4.</sup> Talib Husain, Tadhkirah Sayyidna Ghawth-i A'zam (Lahore: Shu'a'-i Adab, p. 151.

<sup>5.</sup> P.6.

medium. One day a gentleman interested in palmistry approached her with the request to call the spirit of late Cheiro, the famous palmist, for consultation on a tricky issue. The lady asked him to place his palm on the table for reading. Then she went into a trance and said: "Good morning everybody. Cheiro speaking." Then through the medium Cheiro spoke about the lines of the hand of the gentleman for about seven minutes.<sup>6</sup>

During the last ninety years a large number of books have been written in Europe on all forms of E.S.P. and parapsychology. They all go to prove that the claims regarding the possession of such powers by mystics and saints of the past were not just tall claims.

Now we come to the question as to why and how E.S.P. is possible. The answer on which almost all believers in E.S.P. seem to agree is that E.S.P. and psychical phenomena are possible because in man, besides the physical body, there is an astral or psychical body which is not governed by the laws of the physical world or the so-called laws of Nature. In this regard Rt. Rev. C W. Leadbeater writes: "You are not your body. You inhibit your body. Bodies are mere shells which we cast aside like a suit of clothing."

Scientists have been trying to invent devices to prove the existence of the astral body. A European spiritualist prepared a machine, with a glass chamber known as Wilson Chamber. A living frog was placed inside the chamber and air was pumped out of it. A meter was also fitted into the chamber. As soon as the frog died, the needle would at once point to "D" (i.e. death). Simultaneously photographs of the frog were taken with powerful cameras. A number of times two photographs of the frog appeared on the film, one that of the physical body of the frog and the other that of its

<sup>6.</sup> Dr. Ghulam Jilani Barq, Man Ki Dunya, pp. 218-19.

<sup>7.</sup> Rt. Rev. C.W. Leadbeater, Invisible Helpers.

astral body. This astral body was found at a distance of about five inches above the frog's body, and exactly resembling it. However, it was ethereal in form like mist. Dr R.A. Watters, a physicist, worked on the machine for a long time and published his findings under the caption "Intra Atomic Quantity".8

According to Mrs Gaskil, a spiritualist, there are two systems working simultaneously in the body. One is the physical and the other "etheric". The "etheric," body lives in the atoms of the physical body and separates on death. The real body is the "etheric" body, while the physical body is just like a shell or an inn wherein the real body has only a temporary abode.

Mr Trine, another famous spiritualist, writes: "Here, in this world, our bodies are dual, physical and etheric. These two bodies interpenetrate each other but the etheric body is permanent. The physical body is only a protective covering for the etheric body during its passage through the earth life." <sup>10</sup>

So we see that the explanation given by the spiritualists for E.S.P. and other related phenomena is that there exists in us an etheric or astral body which transcends the barriers of space and therefore, has the some sort of supernatural powers.

The belief that the only sources of knowledge are our senseorgans and also that each sense-organ is capable of receiving only a particular type of sense-data is no longer tenable. European ophthalmologists have discovered the presence of the retinal cells under the human skin all over the body. That is why some people are capable of seeing while they are tightly blindfolded. This is not a new belief. In ancient times, the art of reading without using eyes was

<sup>8.</sup> Cf. Dr. Ghulam Jilani Barq, op. cit., p. 57

<sup>9.</sup> Mrs. Gaskil, What is Life.

<sup>10.</sup> R.W. Trine, In Tune With the Infinite.

acquired by certain people through practice.

It may, therefore, rightly be concluded that the presence in man of higher and more refined sources of knowledge, hithertofore untapped, cannot now be ruled out. After all our knowledge of the capabilities of human beings is still incomplete and is continuously expanding in the same way as our knowledge of the plant life is continuously being revolutionised by the discovery of new facts about them. For example, till recently plants used to be considered as just living but not sentient. However, it has now been proved that they are even more sentient than human beings. A plant can feel the intentions of an approaching person and can be affected by his undisclosed thinking. Instruments to record their feelings and reactions in various conditions have been developed and now we know that plants sing, laugh and weep just as we do. Sir Jagdis Chandra Bose, a Bengali botanist, has written a book entitled *Plant* Autographs and Their Revelations. In this book he tells us that plants sleep and wake up. They can be anaesthesised by administering chloroform into their roots. Maulana Shabbir Ahmad 'Uthmani, the great religious leader who was in the vanguard of the Pakistan Movement, rightly observes: "Now we should take care while using the term 'Laws of Nature'. When we see something happening differently from the known pattern, we should not hastily pronounce it as against the 'Law of Natures,"11

The invention of Wireless, Radio and Television has proved the possibility of similar powers in human beings. There was a time when no sane person would even think of listening to distant sounds or exchanging messages or seeing things happening at great distances. It was considered against the "Laws of Nature". But the invention of instruments which have turned these impossibilities into possibilities have revolutionised our concept of a law of Nature.

<sup>11.</sup> Maulana Shabbir Ahmad 'Uthmani, Islam aur Mu'jizat, p. 113.

These instruments, i.e. Wireless, Radio and Television, which receive sounds and pictures at great distances are made of metals and they are dead matter. Previously the metals were there but only their particular arrangement was wanting to make them capable of receiving distant sounds and pictures. When scientists discovered the right type of the arrangement of the metallic parts of the instruments, they acquired the power to receive distant sounds and pictures. Therefore, there is a clear possibility that human brain, which is definitely superior to metals, if properly trained and in some individuals even without any training, can become capable of receiving distant sounds and pictures. In other words, people who are capable of E.S.P. and of contact with the spirits of the dead, may be considered as human wireless, radio and television sets. Dr. Ghulam Jilani Barq has told the story of a French couple who had become human wireless sets. The husband worked in an office. Whenever a guest came to him he used to close his eyes and with powerful concentrated thought would telepathically tell his wife to prepare meals for the guest, which she did. Similarly, we may say that Hadrat 'Umar and his general, Hadrat Sariyah, were both human wireless sets

If what has been said above is true, and there is no reason to believe it to be otherwise, then there is no ground to reject the view held by a large section of humanity that the world of matter is subordinate to mind or consciousness. Even scientists seem to be gradually coming round to this view. For example, Sir James Jeans admits that he is inclined to sharing the Idealists' view that consciousness is the fundamental reality and the physical world is derived from it.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, Max Planck also thinks that consciousness cannot be explained with the help of matter and its laws. According to him, consciousness is the basic reality and matter

<sup>12.</sup> Sir James Jeans, The Mysterious World.

is derivable from it.13

This leads us to the belief that in man there lie hidden certain powers which, if fully tapped and exploited, can enable him conquer the world of matter and rise above the so-called laws of Nature, thus to transcend the barriers placed on him by his physical body.

So far we have been concerned with the question of the meaning and nature of E.S.P., but now we must discuss its relation with religion. Religion and spirituality or the power of E.S.P. are generally considered synonymous. Though close relationship between the two is admitted in Islam, yet some differentiation is made between formal religion (Shari'ah) and real religion (Tarigah). The former consists in the adherence to the rituals prescribed by religion, while the latter consists in personal experience of the Divine Being and the cultivation of the inner self. Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, after explaining this distinction between the two, adds: "Then it has become evident that there are two aspects, outer and inner aspects, of religion.... After the Prophet's death there appeared two forms of adherence to religion: those persons who were endowed with the capability of sticking to the Shari'ah became custodians of the outer form of religion. This is the class of jurists, bearers of tradition, Ghazis and the Qaris.... The second group of the champions of religion consists of the people whom God has endowed with the capability of preserving the inner aspect of religion—the inner aspect of religion is also known as Ihsan. The company and conversation of the people of this group has the power to charge those who come in contact with them with magnetism and an extraordinary power of influencing others. All types of supernatural deeds are performed by them. A person of this group comes to know the hidden intentions of other people through E.S.P. and with God's help brings about change "in the routine course of events."14

Therefore, according to this view, E.S.P. and spiritualism are considered as part or offshoot of religion. On the contrary, there are people who think that E.S.P. is not necessarily dependent on religion, as it may exist even without religion. For example, Ra'is Amrohvi, a prolific writer on E.S.P. and related phenomena, Thus روحیت and psychicism روحیت Thus he writes: "It is difficult to understand the problems and discussions of parapsychology without first understanding the difference between the spiritual and psychical points of view of life. Spiritualism is based on a particular (religious) creed, whereas psychicism is a scientific and empirical theory. Parapsychology deals only with psychical phenomena, e.g. E.S.P. (Normal) Psychology lays stress on the view that the only sources of human perception are the sensory and motor nerves. Parapsychology does concede the importance of the sense-organs in the acquisition of knowledge, but it also claims that in man there are certain supernormal powers by which, if he uses them, he can acquire the knowledge of some or most of the facts without the use of sense-organs. 15 Then he goes on to define psychicism in the following words: "Psychicism is the name of that particular psychological or mental state which sometimes raises mind above ordinary level of consciousness and brings it into contact with certain mysterious forces or some unknown laws....Precognition of future events, predictions, spells, inspiration, intuition, E.S.P., are some of the psychical phenomena and fall within the scope of parapsychology." 16 He further adds: "Spiritualism recognises duality of spirit and body, each having its own sphere and its own objectives. From the psychical point of view, human existence has three planes,

<sup>14.</sup> Shah Wali Aallah, *Ham'at*, translated in Urdu by Muhammad Sarwar (Lahore: Sind Sagar Academy), pp. 40-43.

<sup>15.</sup> Ra'is Amrohvi, Psychology and Parapsychology (Urdu), p. 61.

<sup>16.</sup> Ibid, p. 62.

i.e. physical body, astral body and spirit. parapsychology or psychicism does not deal with the functions of the spirit since it is the business of spiritualism, and spirit has a religious tinge. Psychicism is open mindedly neutral to religious and spiritual creed.<sup>17</sup> According to the writer, psychicism deals with the astral body, its functions, its relationship with physical body and so forth.

Here the wording of the description of psychicism and spiritualism which the writer has employed is a bit lopsided and confused since he has not been a regular student of psychology, but the point of view which he is trying to put forward is quite clear. In his opinion there is no necessary relationship between religion and E.S.P. People who do not subscribe to a particular religion, or do not subscribe to any religion at all, may acquire, and in history are known to have acquired, the power of E.S.P., because all human beings have astral body. But it may rightly be pointed out that all human beings have spirit too, and it is not possible to precisely distinguish between spirit and psyche or astral Body. Even Muslim thinkers and mystics admit that even nonbelievers of religion can cultivate in themselves the supernatural powers, but they are considered inferior in nature. Muslim theologians have coined terms to distinguish different planes of he supernatural powers. In a prophet they lead to prophetic miracle (mu'jizah), in a follower of the prophet they lead to mystic miracle (karamat) and in a nonbeliever they lead to acquired miracle (istidraj)

Without philosophising on this issue it can be said that all those who acquire the power of E.S.P. do believe in reality beyond the world of matter and the supremacy of the spiritual being over the physical being. Therefore, such people may or may not be believers in any religion, but they do utilise and develop a power whose basis may be termed as religious. As such, E.S.P. and other related powers

<sup>17.</sup> Ibid., p. 69.

are linked with religion, although one may acquire these powers without consciously subscribing to any religion.

The most interesting part of the study of E.S.P. is the consideration of the question of the methods and techniques which can be used for the acquisition of the power of E.S.P. It is believed that some people are innately endowed with such powers. Mystics, spiritualists and writers on E.S.P. tell us that other people can cultivate such powers by certain exercises. Some of these exercises have been generally used by mystics, while others have been used by other people. The main aim of most of these exercises is gaining the concentration of attention. Various exercises for gaining the concentration of attention have been practised since times immemorial. Even primitive people were quite well versed in this art. Crystal-gazing was the most popular method. Sometimes any other shining object was also used for this purpose. Assyrians were specially well known for making use of a number of exercises for achieving the concentration of mind. From them this art was learnt by Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, Chinese and Tibetans. The latter two nations made some innovations in this field. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries crystal-gazing was widely practised in Europe. In Egypt, mediums were asked to gaze constantly at the flame of a lamp which was filled with a mixture of wine and oil. In our own country oil is poured in a shining metal tray and a burning lamp placed inside it. Then the medium is seated in a dark room and asked to gaze, without blinking eyes, at the reflection of the flame in the oil. Sometimes the medium is required to gaze at the oiled nail of his thumb. This is a practice which has been inherited from our ancestors. In this way a state of hypnotic trance is induced in the medium and in that state he acquires the power of E.S.P. and he makes correct predictions, tells the names of the thieves and sees pictures of the absent individuals.

Muslim sufis for acquiring the power of E.S.P. First of all is the meditation of the real name of God الشراع This consists in constantly gazing at the word "Allah" (الشراء) written in white Arabic letters on a black background. Similarly, there is the meditation of the Holy Prophet which consists in constantly gazing at the word "Muhammad" (عراجة) in shining white Arabic characters on a black background. Some sufis prescribe dhikr (عراجة) of the Kalimah, the dhikr of Allah Hu الشراء The dhikr may be loud (عراجة). Shah Wali Allah of Delhi also suggests, apart from these dhikrs, the remembrance of death, reading of the stories of love and listening to music. The aim is to induce a peculiar mood in the mind of the seeker.

Other sufis talk of other types of meditation. Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanvi describes five stages of contemplation, viz.:

- (i) Dhikr (remembrance), i.e. contemplation of the beloved who is absent.
- (ii) Hudur (Presence), i.e. contemplation of the beloved who is visible but is at some distance.
- (iii) Mukashafah (Vision), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved who is present close by so that his looks are clearly visible.
- (iv) Mushahadah and Fana' (Observation and Absorption), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved who is too close and the observer is lost and absorbed in his contemplation.
- (v) Mu'a'inah, Fana' al-Fana (Unification and Absolute Absorption), i.e. the contemplation of the beloved so deeply that the contemplator becomes one with him.

<sup>18.</sup> Op. cit., p. 64.

Hindu mystics prefer holding of the breath and meditation of *Pramatma*, i.e. the "infinite self," for the same purpose.

In all these exercises the posture of the body plays an important role. One ought also to be physically clean and pure. As already pointed out, the real purpose of all these exercises is the gaining of complete concentration of mind on an external or ideational object. Such undistracted concentration for quite a long time, it is believed, leads to the acquisition of supernatural powers like E.S.P., mediumship and hypnotism.

The other exercises which are often used for acquiring-super natural powers are:

- (i) Lacanomancy or candle gazing.
- (ii) Captromancy or mirror gazing.
- (iii) Hydromancy or water gazing.
- (iv) Crystal-gazing ( ).
- (v) Point-gazing ( )
- (vi) Sun-gazing.
- (vii) Moon-gazing.
- (viii) Nose-gazing ( البعير )
  - (ix) Cross-gazing ( التجلي ), i.e. gazing at the root of the nose, both eyeballs trying to look at each other.
    - (x) Shadow-gazing.
  - (xi) Meditation of any source of light.
- (xii) Meditation of an imaginary point of light in any part of the body, specially in the heart.

When the attention is concentrated on any of the objects listed above to the point of absolute absorption, one starts experiencing E.S.P. Some researchers in the nature of E.S.P. have even shown the physiological basis of the supernatural powers. By constantly gazing, without blinking eyes and by riveting full attention at a certain point

or object, a state of self-hypnosis is caused. It results in the "disassociation of consciousness," and from within it emerges a timeless-spaceless consciousness or the astral body. The seat of this consciousness is supposed to be the pineal gland which is activated by the functioning of the pituitary gland in the brain. Constant gazing at a point or meditation of an object causes it to function.

These are only a few of the innumerable exercises which have been prevalent among mystics and spiritualists belonging to various religious groups. It is believed that anybody who undertakes these exercises in the manner prescribed for each can develop in himself the power of E.S.P., although the degree of success may differ from individual to individual according to his aptitude and effort.

So much convincing data on the subject of E.S.P. is now available that it will be unscientific to brush it aside as mere superstition. In fact, there is need for a thorough systematic empirical study of this subject. It may be mentioned here that, some years back, the Government of India allowed and even financed the creation of chairs for the subjects of astrology, palmistry and other predictive sciences, in various universities, where much useful research work is being done. In Pakistan and many other countries, E.S.P. and other related fields of study are considered nothing more than mere abracadabra.

It is, therefore, recommended that a State-financed Society for Psychical Research be formed in Pakistan to undertake research in parapsychology and other allied fields in the light of the teachings of Islam.

